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During World War II, the Army Air Force waged three strategic air offensives in and 
from China against Japan. At first, the Flying Tigers and 10th Air Force constituted the 
whole of American aid to China, but the effort soon expanded. Supported by Chiang Kai-
shek, Claire Chennault and his 14th Air Force waged an anti-shipping campaign, to which 
the Japanese Imperial Army responded with Operation Ichigo and against which Joseph 
Stilwell accurately warned. 20th Bomber Command used B-29s to wage Operation 
Matterhorn, failed, and later conducted PACAID missions. 14th Air Force then waged a 
counterproductive transportation campaign as The Pacific War, also known as the Greater 
East Asian War, ended. Events in the China-Burma-India and China Theaters provide 
lessons in logistics, targeting, training, and air-ground cooperation that are applicable in 




ANSHAN II AND THE AIRPOWER THEATER 
 
 For Major General Curtis LeMay, September 8, 1944, was a day unlike any other 
day. LeMay spent much of his twelfth day as the commanding general of the Twentieth 
Bomber Command flying in a B-29 Superfortress high over Japanese-occupied China, 
leading his wing in their second attack against the coke ovens of the Showa Steel Works 
near Anshan, Manchuria. Already a noted bomber commander from the European 
Theater of World War II, LeMay took command of the Twentieth from its previous, 
interim commander, Brigadier General Laverne Saunders, with orders to increase the 
pace and effectiveness of Operation Matterhorn, the Twentieth’s operations against the 
Japanese steel industry. General Henry Arnold, commander of the United States Army 
Air Force, expected the world’s heaviest and longest ranged operational bomber force to 
begin in earnest, under LeMay’s guiding hand, the destruction of the inner sanctums of 
the Japanese Empire.1 
 The men of the Twentieth Bomber Command grew steadily more excited during 
the three weeks between their August 20, 1944 attack against Yawata, Japan, and the 
command’s eighth and next mission, Anshan II, on September 8, 1944. As the B-29s 
ceaselessly droned back and forth across the Himalayan Mountains, hauling the supplies 
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that the support sections of the command steadily loaded onto the planes in India and 
unloaded from them in China, a crowd of seemingly out-of-place officers grew at the 
Twentieth’s bases around Chengtu, China. Every colonel who could get away from his 
job in either India or China seemed to want to ride along for the big show. The arrival of 
Major General LeMay presaged big things for the Twentieth and when the weather 
forecasters and the command’s logisticians agreed that September 8, 1944, would be a 
good day, the men heard the order to attack and responded with enthusiasm. Everyone 
hoped that the endless, grinding task of hauling supplies would begin to end and that they 
could begin to travel more quickly the long, dangerous road to the destruction of Japan.2 
 The evening of September 7, 1944, brought renewed confidence from all sections 
of the Twentieth Bomber Command. The weather section reported that the next day’s 
weather over the target area would be as nearly perfectly clear as could be hoped for. The 
ground crews finished loading most of the giant bombers and repairing the last, nagging 
maintenance problems that appeared so regularly in the highly complex machines. The 
last straggling aircraft returned from India that day too, and the crews hurried to ready 
them for the next day’s mission even as darkness fell across Western China. The air 
crews endured their rest periods and wondered what the next day would bring while the 
commanders already knew too many details to do anything but worry. The Twentieth’s 
record lent no one any reasons to be sanguine about the next day’s mission.3 
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 Sanguine or not, the men of the Twentieth Bomber Command performed 
exceptionally well during Anshan II. Aircrews took advantage of exceptionally clear 
weather to assemble into better than average formations, though few formations achieved 
eight aircraft in size, let alone the prescribed twelve aircraft that the men trained for. 
Again because of clear weather, ninety of one hundred fifteen aircraft that took off that 
morning found and bombed the Showa Steel Works, a substantial improvement upon the 
Twentieth’s record to date, and most made visual bombing runs over unusually light and 
scattered clouds. Light opposition combined with minimal mechanical trouble and a low 
rate of crew errors to destroy a comparatively minimal four of the Twentieth’s aircraft, 
with clear weather again helping all aircraft, this time to find their way home or to 
another safe airbase.4 
 While over the Showa Steel Works, the Twentieth Bomber Command achieved 
exceptionally accurate results due to a combination of favorable circumstances. The 
combination of the Twentieth’s July 29, 1944 mission to Anshan and Anshan II, 
destroyed six and damaged two of the seventeen coke oven batteries at the Showa 
facility. September 8, 1944, found the Twentieth over Anshan on one of the 
approximately three mid days per September during which the area experienced generally 
clear skies and on which the Twentieth’s bombardiers could bomb as they trained, 
visually, rather than resorting to radar bombsights for which the Twentieth lacked 
adequate training and manuals. Clear weather and the Twentieth’s consequently 
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improved formations further aided the Twentieth’s accuracy because the bombardiers 
trained and aimed for a twelve aircraft formation; formations closer to twelve aircraft 
achieved more accurate results because their bomb patterns centered better on the 
targets.5 
 The exceptional results of Anshan II helped to prove the failure of Operation 
Matterhorn. The Twentieth Bomber Command could, if it achieved results similar to 
those of Anshan II every time it attacked, destroy every Japanese coke oven within reach 
within two or three months. The Twentieth could not achieve those results however, 
because only blind luck put a rare day of clear weather onto the calendar immediately 
after the Twentieth accumulated a stockpile of supplies and aircraft in China and 
performed the maintenance required to conduct a mission and before a less lucky mission 
wasted laboriously stockpiled fuel. The September 1944, meeting of the Committee of 
Operations Analysts in Washington recognized the achievement of Anshan II but also 
recognized that if the Twentieth could not repeat such performances in rapid succession 
then the war would end before the attack against the Japanese steel industry could bear 
fruit. Anshan III, on September 26, 1944, failed to inflict noticeable new damage, due 
largely to total cloud cover over the target, so the Committee of Operations Analysts 
recommended, and General Arnold ordered, that Operation Matterhorn end. Thus, the 
unusual success of Anshan II marks the failure of the second, and most ambitious, of 
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three strategic air offensives that the United States Army Air Force conducted in China 
during World War II.6 
 During the course of World War II, the United States Army Air Force attempted 
three separate and distinctly unwise strategic air offensives in and from China. These 
three efforts consumed substantial resources that could have rendered substantial 
assistance to the Allied war effort but that went instead to China, where poor planning 
and political considerations sent them on a quest that geographic and logistical realities 
made impossible to complete. In China, the United States Army Air Force repeatedly 
ignored the principles of war and common sense while attempting to work with China’s 
ruling Kuomintang Party and the Chinese Army, neither of which conducted strategically 
significant offensive activities within China against the Japanese between 1941 and 1944. 
The resulting effort seemed to provoke, with each step toward victory, a Japanese 
response that pushed the China Theater two steps closer to defeat. In the early twenty-
first century, with diplomacy often backed by air strikes and with militaries shrinking and 
heavily committed across the globe, air power increasingly takes the premier role in such 
conflicts as those in Bosnia and Kosovo and against the Osama bin Ladin terrorist 
network. The lessons that the United States government learned in China during World 
War II may be of use to diplomats and fighting forces alike, when air power appears to be 
either the only, or at least the most practicable, solution to international crises. 
 In early 1942, with the Japanese armed forces rampaging through the Pacific 
Ocean and pushing into the Indian Ocean and Burma, President of the United States 
Franklin Roosevelt and other leaders of the United States decided that they must aid 
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China. A minimal investment in aid to China could secure the large dividend of tying 
down significant Japanese forces there and of denying to the Japanese the use of free 
China’s resources. With that realization and decision, the trickle of aid that began to flow 
from the Western Allies to China in late-1937, after the Japanese invasion of China, 
began to grow steadily and, by 1945, became a torrent. At first the aid came in small 
amounts and served defensive purposes in accordance with long-standing principles of 
war, but by mid-1943, the United States Army Air Force began to risk disaster in China 
by conducting unsustainable and provocative offensives from insecure Chinese bases. 
 In mid-1943, General Claire Chennault’s still tiny Fourteenth Air Force began an 
anti-shipping campaign from airbases in East China. With few aircraft and too little 
logistical support to operate those few aircraft properly, and with his airbases protected 
by the same Chinese Army that almost never stopped the Japanese during any of the 
numerous campaigns between 1937 and 1943, Chennault ostensibly planned to win the 
war in Asia. President Roosevelt joined Chennault in discounting the possibility that the 
Imperial Japanese Army might not allow the Fourteenth Air Force to win the war and 
might instead choose to seize Chennault’s airbases or even overthrow the Kuomintang 
and force China out of the war as an organized power. 
 In early-1944, the first combat units of the new B-29 bombers began to flow 
toward the China Theater on a mission to destroy Japan’s coke ovens, and consequently 
the Japanese steel industry. A combination of lack of security in China and a 
miscalculation of required training time resulted in hundreds of thousands of Chinese 
peasants laboring for months to build B-29 bases that ended up being too far from the 
ovens to allow effective B-29 operations against them. The abysmal logistical situation 
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made timely success impossible in any case and a Japanese offensive in China served up 
further difficulty for the B-29 units by exacerbating the logistical situation and 
threatening to overthrow the Chinese government and to overrun the logistical bases upon 
which the B-29s depended. 
 Finally, in early-1945, the Fourteenth Air Force began a campaign, loosely self-
described as strategic, to hinder or prevent the ongoing transfer of Japanese forces from 
southern China to Northeast Asia. The Fourteenth attempted to use its long-awaited 
numerical superiority and ample logistical support to magnify the effects of previous 
strikes against Japanese lines of communication by continually sweeping the rail lines, 
roads, and rivers of much of occupied China, destroying every locomotive, rail car, river 
craft, ground vehicle, and draft animal that they could find. The only difficulty with the 
plan lay in that its success would be worse for the cause of the Allies than its failure. The 
Allied powers wanted Japanese forces to leave South Asia and southern and eastern 
China as quickly as possible, not to be delayed in their leaving or, even worse, persuaded 
to remain in place. In the longer term, the destruction by the United States Army Air 
Force of the lines of communication in occupied China could only weaken the Chinese 
economy and the Kuomintang’s hold on power after the occupation ended, thus working 
against the very goal of the American mission to China—to aid the Kuomintang to 
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CHAPTER 2 
DEVELOPMENTS: AMERICAN AIR POWER AND THE SITUATION IN EAST 
ASIA INTO 1943 
 
 Between World War I and World War II, the United States Army Air Corp, 
renamed the United States Army Air Force in June 1941, developed doctrines for both 
the strategic and tactical uses of air power. Strategic and tactical plans both called for the 
combined efforts of the strategic and tactical forces to begin any war by attacking the 
enemy’s aerial strength. Only after gaining air superiority did the Army Air Force expect 
to shift its primary efforts to other duties. The United States Army expected tactical air 
activity to take several forms: pursuit aviation against enemy aircraft in flight, counter-air 
bombings of enemy airbases, interdiction of enemy lines of communication, close tactical 
support of ground forces, and attacks against enemy ships. These tactical activities served 
either to protect friendly forces and assets or to assist friendly forces to succeed in their 
own operations. Strategic air operations played an altogether different role.7 
 The United States Army Air Force created strategic bombing doctrine that called 
for massive and prolonged bombing operations against industrial targets, the destruction 
of which would eventually eliminate the enemy’s physical ability to wage war. Almost 
everyone expected this path—victory through air power—to be long. No one factory, 
however large or important, served as an indispensable cog in any enemy’s industrial 
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system and an enemy could both improvise and rely on stockpiles for some time after 
even the most complete destruction of a given industry. Strategic planners expected to 
attack numerous targets across a range of industries before the enemy began, months or 
even years later, to run out of critical supplies.8 
 The United States Army Air Force’s strategic bombing doctrine called for aircrew 
to attack enemy industrial facilities with precision, in daylight and from high altitude. 
Doctrine called for precision bombing because planners believed precision possible, and 
because precision seemed more efficient and less immoral than area bombing. Precision 
bombing mandated daylight operations because radar bombsights simply did not exist in 
the 1930s and proved less than perfect even in the middle 1940s. Daylight operations 
mandated high altitude operations because anti-aircraft artillery would savage large 
aircraft operating at the middle altitudes and because formations of large bombers could 
not safely operate at the treetop altitudes at which anti-aircraft artillery lost some of its 
flexibility and effectiveness. Daylight operations also mandated heavy defensive 
armaments and substantial durability because, although open cockpit biplane interceptors 
could not operate with significant effectiveness at high altitudes, more modern 
monoplane pursuit aircraft posed a potentially serious threat to bombers at any altitude.9 
 The United States Army Air Force regarded strategic bombing as likely to be an 
affair conducted at long range. The industrial heartlands of most potential adversaries lay 
beyond the reach of pursuit and light bombardment aircraft operating from likely base 
areas. Geography thus mandated that strategic bombers possess a long range and airplane 
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manufacturers responded to Air Corps prodding by proposing four-engine aircraft that 
combined long-range capability with doctrinal requirements for a stable bombing 
platform, heavy defensive armament, high altitude capability, durability, and the 
perpetual desire for larger payloads. Army Air Force thinking thus separated light 
bombardment and pursuit aircraft, with their mere hundreds of miles of range, from 
strategic bombardment because planners expected the smaller aircraft to be able to reach 
few if any strategic targets. Planners hoped for, but did not count upon, escort aircraft and 
subsidiary bombardment efforts to aid the strategic air effort made by the United States in 
any future conflict: the Army Air Force planned to strategic bomb using four-engine 
bombers.10 
 The United States Army Air Force’s doctrinal requirement for a four-engine 
bomber aside, the quest for such an aircraft did not begin to proceed smoothly or rapidly 
until 1939. In 1933 and 1934, the United States Army Air Corp made several, informal 
requests to aircraft manufacturing companies that they investigate the idea of designing 
four-engine bombers. On June 26, 1934, after the Boeing and Martin Companies 
submitted data in response to Army Air Corp requests, the Army let contracts to those 
two companies to conduct mock-up and wind tunnel tests to gather further data. Then, on 
August 22, 1934, the Army requested that the Boeing, Martin, and Douglas companies 
submit designs for four-engine bombers. In May 1935, the process seemed about to yield 
fruit when, after substantial discussion between the Army and the United States 
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Congress, Congress authorized the Army to purchase five hundred aircraft, including 
twenty-six four-engine and one hundred sixty-six two-engine bombers.11 
 After the auspicious authorization of a five hundred aircraft purchase in May 
1935, the United States Congress rapidly backpedaled and, in July 1935, reduced the 
United States Army’s budget. In response to this funding cut the Army reordered its 
priorities, ordering thirteen of the new B-17, four-engine bombers from Boeing on 
January 17, 1936. The Army briefly continued with other projects, besides just the B-17, 
but in May 1936 the United States War Department cut another one hundred nine aircraft 
from the Army’s budget, including all long-range bombing and reconnaissance aircraft 
except for the thirteen B-17s already ordered from Boeing. After further discussion 
within the Army, in August 1937 the Army decided not to issue any more contracts for 
four-engine aircraft until the B-17 project, and a single, experimental aircraft in the 1938 
budget, proved themselves in trials. The Army Air Corp continued to try to win approval 
for four-engine aircraft projects but did not succeed until June 1938, when the War 
Department added another eleven B-17s to the 1939 budget. In June 1939, the United 
States Army Air Corp fielded exactly fourteen four-engine aircraft, with one of those 
serving only as an experiment.12 
 As the United States slipped into World War II, Congress rapidly increased 
military funding and industry rapidly increased production of military equipment. By 
1942, the Army Air Force attempted to meet the demand for strategic bombers with two 
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types of aircraft: the long-awaited B-17 and the relative newcomer B-24. The B-17 
Flying Fortress began the war in squadron service in the Philippine Islands and fared 
poorly, primarily due to a lack of both logistical support and secure bases. Soon 
thereafter, the B-24 Liberator came into service and from mid-1942 began to replace the 
B-17 in Pacific Ocean areas; the B-24 possessed the longer range of the two aircraft and 
long range proved to be of critical importance in the vast Pacific Theater. In Europe, 
against the German Air Force and the massed anti-aircraft artillery that protected German 
industrial installations, the B-17 proved to be the more battle worthy and became the 
more numerous of the two strategic bombers, though the B-24 also served in Europe in 
large numbers. B-24s, with their exceptionally long range, also served admirably as naval 
patrol aircraft, playing a large role in the Battle of the Atlantic and thus in making an 
Allied victory possible in Europe.13 
 The ultimate expression, during World War II, of the United States Army Air 
Force’s tendency toward larger strategic bombers flowed from the conception, in the 
summer of 1939, of the Very Long Range project. The Army Air Force originally stated 
that the Very Long Range project would provide bombers to defend the United States by 
striking targets at great distances from the Americas. On December 2, 1939, the United 
States War Department authorized the Very Long Range project, ordering Major General 
Arnold, the chief of the Army Air Force, to create a bomber with a heretofore unheard of 
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tactical radius of action, eventually settled as fifteen hundred miles. Later military 
developments transformed the Very Long Range project into a source for a weapon that 
the Army Air Force could deploy against enemy industrial areas even if ideal base areas 
in potentially allied countries became unavailable for use. Scenarios for which Army Air 
force planners considered the Very Long Range project essential included bombing 
Germany from the Middle East or Japan from Alaska or Siberia. Simple recognition of 
geographical reality quickly disabused serious planners of notions of transoceanic 
bombing while weather and range killed ideas of bombing most of Japan from Alaska 
and diplomacy eliminated the likelihood of bombing anything from Siberia. Beyond these 
worst-case scenarios, the project served to provide a bomber with a tremendous load at 
shorter ranges, in case of better bases being available.14 
 In June 1940, Boeing and Consolidated-Vultee won Very Long Range project 
contracts to study experimental designs of what eventually became the B-29 and the B-32 
respectively. Later in 1940, both of these companies won further contracts to proceed 
with work on prototypes of these aircraft. The United States Army Air Force Air Staff 
made almost constant changes to the requirements of the Very Long Range project, but 
Boeing still managed to find some success in its B-29 project. In view of the world crisis 
and of its own success, Boeing undertook to shorten the developmental time required for 
the B-29 from the previously standard five years to four and, in June 1941, won a 
contract to build fourteen production model B-29s. By January 1942, Army Air Force 
orders rose to five hundred aircraft and the B-29 became the first military aircraft ordered 
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into full production in the United States before the producer even completed a 
prototype.15 
 Not unexpectedly, troubles plagued the B-29 throughout its early life. The United 
States Army Air Force made thousands of design changes in the engines alone between 
1940 and 1943 and the progress of the aircraft suffered accordingly, especially when the 
first prototype crashed and killed its crew. Finally, in early 1943, the long-time 
commander of the Army Air Force, General Arnold became sufficiently concerned over 
the constant delays and ordered a cessation to changes in the B-29 design unless the 
change concerned actual flight safety. The project then moved forward more quickly and 
Boeing delivered the first production B-29 in July 1943. The B-29 continued to suffer 
from a variety of ailments, only some of which manifested themselves before the plane 
entered combat, but the crews of the new 20th Bomber Command finally began to train 
with their new steeds.16 
 The specifications in the contract that the United States Army Air Force let to 
Boeing, and Boeing’s high-technology response to those specifications provided the 
Army Air Force with a truly advanced B-29 weapon system. The B-29 carried an unheard 
of standard armament of twelve fifty-caliber machineguns, including four mounted in a 
single turret, and one twenty millimeter cannon, all fired by means of remote, 
computerized sights from inside the aircraft’s pressurized cabin. Four Wright R-3350-23 
engines propelled the B-29 at a cruising speed of two hundred twenty miles per hour, to a 
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ceiling of thirty-one thousand eight hundred fifty feet, and to a maximum range of five 
thousand eight hundred thirty miles. The engines themselves demonstrated a significant 
technical achievement by arranging eighteen cylinders in two radials of nine cylinders 
each and generating an amazing two thousand two hundred horsepower per engine. The 
B-29 measured ninety-nine feet long with a wingspan of just over one hundred forty-one 
feet, theoretically carried a crew of ten and up to twenty thousand pounds of bombs to a 
tactical radius of fifteen hundred miles, and weighed one hundred thirty-two thousand 
pounds when fully loaded. For crews, and especially for gunners accustomed to 
manhandling their guns in a two hundred plus mile per hour wind stream while wearing 
numerous layers of clothes and an oxygen mask, the B-29 represented a veritable heaven 
of technological advancement.17 
The war in which the 20th Bomber Command and the B-29 finally came of age 
began long before the Very Long Range project ever touched paper as a proposal. In 
1922, the Japanese Diet, the parliament of Japan, forced the Japanese Imperial Army to 
withdraw from Siberia by refusing to allocate funding for the adventure, a courageous 
action that began the alienation of the Japanese military from Japanese civilian rule. 
Throughout the 1920s, Japan’s civilian government steadily reduced the Japanese 
military’s funding and repeatedly entered into international agreements that the military 
believed to be unwise. The Japanese civilian government, for instance, returned control 
of the Shantung Peninsula to China and signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact in an attempt to 
outlaw war. The Washington Naval Conference also persuaded the Japanese civilian 
government to accept a navy that seemed inferior to those of the United States and Great 
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Britain, further alienating the Japanese military and persuading much of the Japanese 
population that the West intended to make and keep Japan a second class power.18 
The foreign policy of the United States did not help Japan’s civilian leadership to 
keep the Japanese military in check. When the United States Congress prohibited 
immigration from Japan, the Japanese people saw themselves lumped together with other 
groups into a category that the people of the United States seemed to label as undesirable. 
The insistence of the United States and United Kingdom that Japan limit itself to a navy 
only sixty percent the size of their own navies provided ammunition to Japanese radicals 
who portrayed the West as imperialist and racist and their own civilian government as 
weak and ignoble.19 
By 1931, the civilian government’s seemingly constant debasing of Japan led the 
Japanese military to begin to take matters into their own hands. According to Japan’s 
constitution, Emperor Hirohito set the size of and served as the head of the Japanese 
military. The civilian government’s usurpation of the Emperor’s prerogative, even though 
Hirohito showed little sign of disputing the issue, cost the military its desired power and 
prestige and served as a basis for rallying military opposition to the civilian government. 
A group of relatively junior Japanese officers in the Kwantung territory that Japan leased 
from China led the way to glory by launching a small attack into Manchuria in an effort 
to reverse the military’s downward spiral. The Japanese Kwantung Army, largely based 
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in Korea, then supported them because the generals refused to risk a Japanese defeat and 
the consequent loss of Japanese controlled territory and Japanese military prestige.20 
With Japan more or less at war against China, the Japanese constitution put 
substantially more authority into the hands of an increasingly aggressive Japanese 
military while the hapless Chinese watched Japanese forces divided their country. In the 
face of the Japanese attack and preoccupied with fighting communists within China, the 
Chinese government, led by the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang 
Party, encouraged the warlord of Manchuria to withdraw his forces to North China rather 
than fight the Japanese. The Japanese Imperial Army consequently and almost 
effortlessly seized the whole of the resource rich province of Manchuria with all of its 
heavy industry. The easy victory over both their own government and the Chinese did not 
satisfy Japan’s soldiers and did not serve to adequately muzzle the Diet’s criticisms.21 
China’s people did not accept Japanese aggression as easily as did the 
Kuomintang and the Japanese did not stop, as the Kuomintang hoped they would. A 
popular boycott of Japanese goods began in China soon after Japan invaded Manchuria 
and, in 1932, the Japanese attacked the city of Shanghai in a bid to break the boycott, but 
on this occasion the Kuomintang acceded to popular and warlord demand and stopped the 
Japanese with a tenacious defense. In 1933, the Japanese pounced again, simply moving 
in and taking over Jehol Province and huge portions of the Chahar and Hopei Provinces 
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against a Chinese resistance that showed no evidence of having a plan and that fell apart 
and gave up after a few, uncoordinated skirmishes. In 1937, after four more years of 
incremental Japanese military, economic, and political advances across north China, the 
Japanese military responded to signs of increasing Chinese resistance by invading China 
proper.22 
The Chinese people did not display displeasure about Japanese actions in a 
vacuum. Soon after the Japanese invaded Manchuria, the League of Nations condemned 
Japanese aggression and much of the world adopted a policy of non-recognition of the 
Japanese claim to the area. The Japanese military responded by withdrawing Japan from 
the League and installing a puppet to rule the new country of Manchukuo. Further 
Japanese aggression, including hundreds of bombings of citizens of the United States in 
mission stations across China, led to sanctions against Japan by much of the rest of the 
world. A number of Japanese civilian and senior military leaders also expressed 
dissatisfaction and even attempted to restrain the military, but after a spate of 
assassinations Japanese civilian resistance to Japanese military adventures declined 
markedly. Finally, Soviet and Mongolian forces engaged in a number of military 
encounters against expansionist Japanese and Manchukuoan military forces on mainland 
Asia in the late 1930s.23 
Unlike several earlier Japanese advances into China, the Chinese government, 
under Generalissimo Chiang and the Kuomintang, actively resisted the 1937 Japanese 
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invasion. While Chinese military operations led almost uniformly to disaster, much of the 
world still supported the Chinese position, usually for a mixture of idealistic and 
pragmatic reasons. Between 1937 and 1939, the Soviet Union delivered not only political 
support to China but also sent arms, hundreds of aircraft, and numerous aircrew to fight 
the Japanese in China. Western democracies too began to aid China, with intermittent 
military and economic aid in accordance with the military, political, and economic 
situations of the donor countries. Nonetheless, China could not stop the Japanese.24 
In the summer of 1941, Japanese bombers terrorized the Chinese Nationalist 
government’s last urban refuges daily, weakening the hold of the Kuomintang over what 
remained of free China and spurring it to a new action. To stop these attacks, the Chinese 
government hired a group of American mercenaries, commanded by the retired United 
States Army Air Force Major Chennault, to act as an air interceptor force. Chennault 
organized the mercenaries as the American Volunteer Group and began to train them in 
Burma, using obsolescent P-40 aircraft that the British first received from the United 
States and then passed on to Chinese use as more advanced models became available. 
The American Volunteer Group entered combat for the first time in Burma, fighting 
against the Japanese invasion in December 1941, in an effort to protect the Burma Road, 
China’s last remaining land connection to the Western democracies. The largely British 
and Indian ground forces beneath the American Volunteer Group collapsed in front of the 
Japanese advance and, in the Spring of 1942, Japanese forces seized virtually all of 
Burma, cut the Burma Road, and isolated China from land contact with any friendly 
country except the beleaguered Soviet Union. The American Volunteer Group performed 
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well during the defeat, earning the nickname “The Flying Tigers” before leaving Burma 
to protect the Chinese end of an air route between India and China that, until 1945, served 
as the only means of commerce along which Western aid could flow to China.25 
Even after the debacle in Burma, the United States decided to continue to aid 
China, despite the small base upon which to build the effort and the vast new obstacles to 
overcome. Barely beginning the process of retooling its economy, the United States could 
have made use of scarce material in other theaters, where the difficulties towered less 
high than did the Himalayan Mountains. The United States did not, however, leave China 
to fend for itself; a “can do” attitude and the desire to hurt Japan and help the long-
suffering Chinese prevailed over simple and pessimistic explanations of difficulties. 
President Roosevelt and his advisors also looked further ahead, hoping that a strong, 
nationalist China would evict the Japanese from the continent later in the war and then 
substitute for Japan as an Asian power in post-war East Asia. Roosevelt wanted to 
transform China into a powerful, friendly country and to use it to counter Soviet, British, 
and French colonial expansion. Roosevelt decided that the United States would support 
the Kuomintang and build up the Chinese military in order first to maintain China as an 
independent Allied country in the face of Japanese advances, then to assist to defeat 
Japan through offensive operations, and finally to fill the power vacuum resulting from 
that defeat.26 
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Despite the magnitude of the geographical obstacles and equipment shortages that 
hindered the program of aid to China, Chinese politics served as the fundamental 
difficulty that President Roosevelt’s emissaries and generals encountered while 
attempting to aid China. The Chinese Communists rose like a tide, trickling around both 
Japanese and Nationalist resistance to rule areas displaying only marginal economic 
activity and Kuomintang or Japanese control. The communist menace preoccupied 
Generalissimo Chiang and the Kuomintang; they spent much of China’s war effort 
against the communists rather than the Japanese, while semi-autonomous and often 
disgruntled provincial warlords made intermittent political waves that threatened 
Chiang’s regime. Chiang responded to the warlords by diluting the Chinese officer corps 
with politically loyal but militarily ignorant appointees, resisting the formation of 
efficient military formations, and engineering political discord within individual Chinese 
cliques. The Nationalists managed to retain power throughout the war against Japan, a 
fact perhaps more surprising than how little they could or would do against the 
Japanese.27 
The United States planned to overcome these problems and almost immediately 
began both to amass American forces in China and to funnel assistance to the Chinese 
Nationalists. A relatively blind optimism on the part of numerous officials in Washington 
prevented an accurate assessment of the true problem facing the program to aid China: 
the Kuomintang did not seek to achieve objectives similar to those of the political 
leadership of the United States. Where the aid program that the United States sponsored 
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sought to build and use an effective Chinese military, the Kuomintang sought rather to 
siphon the material aid off for personal enrichment and future use against the 
communists, to minimize the effects of military educational aid that encouraged initiative 
and efficiency and thus created potential rivals who might attack the Kuomintang, and to 
preserve the portions of the Chinese military that seemed loyal to the Nationalists for 
future use against threats that someone else might not prove willing to fight. The 
Kuomintang resisted Japanese aggression for four and a half years before the United 
States entered the war and certainly desired victory over Japan, but the Kuomintang 
demonstrated little desire to achieve victory through the use of Chinese armed forces. 
Except for the Flying Tigers program, an idea sponsored and controlled by the 
Kuomintang that served the end of maintaining the Kuomintang’s political support by 
appearing to protect China from the Japanese at little cost to the Chinese, political discord 
and corruption within China seemed to seep into, weigh down, and eventually rot away 
every American effort to help China.28 
In early 1942, five American four-engine bombers that escaped from the 
campaigns for the Philippine Islands and Java in the Netherlands East Indies (modern 
Indonesia,) fled to India to take up the struggle there. At about the same time, the Tenth 
Air Force headquarters, under Major General Lewis Brereton, arrived in India from the 
United States to command the American air effort in the China-Burma-India Theater. The 
United States Army Air Force absorbed the American Volunteer Group in May 1942 as 
the Twenty-third Pursuit Squadron, activated the China Air Task Force on July 4, 1942, 
and promoted the recently recalled Colonel Chennault, previously retired from the United 
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States Army Air Corps as a Major, to Brigadier General to command it. During the first 
half of 1942, the Tenth Air Force received reinforcements and became a full-fledged, all-
arms air force with pursuit (fighter), medium bomber, heavy bomber, and photography 
assets. Even by the diminutive standards of the United States in 1942, however, the Tenth 
still looked like a “poor cousin” because it lacked much of the staff, equipment, and 
simple numbers that higher priority air forces took for granted. For operational control, 
the Tenth Air Force split into two distinct sections: the China Air Task Force under 
Chennault, and an India Air Task Force.29 
 The Tenth Air Force barely began its mission, to support China and attack 
Japanese lines of communication, before a crisis erupted in North Africa, pulling the 
Tenth’s attentions toward the Middle East. General Erwin Rommel led his mixed Italian-
German Africa Corps deep into British controlled Egypt in an advance that threatened to 
seize the Suez Canal. On June 23, 1942, the United States War Department reacted to 
British political pressure and obeyed the “Europe first” Allied grand strategy; it ordered 
Brereton to take all seventeen of his heavy bombers and a scattering of his other assets to 
the Middle East. After Major General Brereton departed for the Middle East, leaving 
Brigadier General Earl Naiden in command of the Tenth, the remainder of the China Air 
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Task Force mustered fewer than 125 fighters and medium bombers, and the India Air 
Task Force deployed even fewer than that.30 
The Tenth Air Force did not lack only for aircraft; in early and middle 1942, the 
Tenth suffered from a variety of ailments. Due to the ongoing crisis in the Middle East, 
the Tenth’s priority for replacements, reinforcements, and logistical support dropped 
dramatically and both the Japanese naval excursion into the Indian Ocean and the 
German submarine blitz against the Eastern seaboard of the United States claimed 
considerable portions of the remainder. The Tenth did receive a few aircraft 
reinforcements in mid-1942, but combat losses and severe maintenance difficulties 
continually eroded fighting strength. The Tenth operated without an adequate supply of 
spare parts, without manuals to find part numbers in order to request the proper parts, and 
with many mechanics drafted from other positions and undergoing on-the-job training. 
The Tenth also lacked any depot-level repair facilities and sent aircraft requiring major 
overhaul to Australia to use the facilities there, if the aircraft could make the trip. On 
April 8, 1942, the Tenth further increased its own difficulties, in obedience to its orders to 
support China, by joining the China National Aviation Corporation in the airlift into 
China over the Himalayan Mountains.31 
While the India Air Task Force of the Tenth Air Force fought to assist British and 
Indian forces to defend India, the China Air Task Force sought to aid China, thus keeping 
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China in the war on the Allied side, and to attack Japanese lines of communication. Early 
in World War II, the embryonic China Air Task Force actually served as the United 
States’ aid to China, until the air lift over the Himalayas built enough capacity to haul 
both supplies for the American air units and for actual Chinese use. As such, Brigadier 
General Chennault designed the operations of the China Air Task Force to protect the 
supply route to the West and prevent Japanese bombers from terrorizing free Chinese 
cities. An aggressive commander, Chennault not only defended the Chinese capital city 
of Chungking and the airlift terminus of Kunming but also attacked the Japanese 
frequently. The China Air Task Force conducted an aerial guerilla war from a web of 
small bases in southern China, attacking airfields and shipping as far afield as Hong 
Kong and Hanoi. In eight months of attrition strategy air warfare, the China Air Task 
Force, never possessing even 125 total aircraft, destroyed some 200 Japanese planes and 
kept the Japanese off-balance and relatively ineffective.32 
The China Air Task Force fulfilled its strategic mission, visibly aiding China in 
order to keep the Chinese in the war, by using imaginative and effective tactics in widely 
scattered operations. The China Air Task Force also marginally contributed, by 
occasional anti-shipping strikes, to the destruction of the Japanese economy. The China 
Air Task Force’s activity did not, however, represent strategic bombing in the classical 
sense; even after the China Air Task Force began to attack railway marshalling yards and 
industrial facilities in Indo-China and occupied China, the sporadic and dispersed effort 
could only have short-term, local effects. Given the weakness of his force, if Brigadier 
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General Chennault had concentrated his attacks in any one area or on any specific type of 
target then massed Japanese resistance would surely have exhausted the China Air Task 
Force long before the China Air Task Force could significantly impair the Japanese 
economy or war effort. Chennault’s aerial guerrilla operations achieved tactical successes 
that buoyed Chinese morale and helped to ensure that China would remain at war with 
Japan, but did not noticeably impair the Japanese ability to wage war—a reasonable trade 
for a weak but growing force facing a strong opponent.33 
By late 1942, the Allies’ logistical situation in the China-Burma-India Theater 
began to improve. Beginning in October 1942, the Tenth Air Force began to receive a 
steady flow of replacement aircraft and other logistical support. In July 1942, Lieutenant 
General Arnold, commander of the United States Army Air Force, also sent or allocated 
units deploying one hundred thirty-three assorted combat aircraft, including the thirty-
five B-24 heavy bombers, to the Tenth Air Force, to arrive over the next six months. The 
United States Air Transport Command assumed command of the Himalayan air route, the 
infamous Hump airlift, on December 1, 1942, and quickly brought increased tonnage into 
China while simultaneously relieving the Tenth Air Force of one preoccupation. While 
China-Burma-India still occupied a very low priority position in terms of receiving Allied 
resources, the aerial situation in South and East Asia began to shift markedly in favor of 
the Allies. The improving aerial situation combined with the China Air Task Force’s 
well-publicized and impressive successes to date encouraged a belief on the part of 
                                                          
33Haulman, High Road, 6; Craven and Cate, Plans, 493–510. 
 
  31  
Brigadier General Chennault that the tide in China had turned and that his forces should 
begin a sustained offensive.34 
On September 17, 1942, Brigadier General Chennault wrote to Lieutenant 
General Arnold, expressing his belief that “a very modest American air force equipped 
with modern airplanes” could destroy the Japanese air forces in six months or less. The 
idea followed Army Air Force doctrine and practice that the destruction of enemy air 
power served as the first objective of any air action by the United States Army Air Force. 
Arnold arrived at the Tenth Air Force headquarters in India on February 2, 1943, to 
discuss Chennault’s ideas with him, and with Brigadier General Clayton Bissell, the latest 
Tenth Air Force commander, and Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell, commander of all 
United States Army forces in the China-Burma-India Theater. In accordance with policies 
set forth by the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, the group decided and Arnold 
ordered that the newly arrived 308th Bombardment Group (Heavy) begin strategic 
bombing operations from China after the air lift over the Himalayan Mountains gathered 
one hundred twenty-four transport aircraft, probably by March 1, 1943.35 
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The February 1943 meeting of the American commanders of the China-Burma-
India Theater brought Lieutenant General Arnold to a position of clarity regarding some 
of the personality conflicts that bedeviled American efforts in the theater. Despite these 
conflicts, early 1942 passed fairly smoothly in the theater because no American 
commander commanded enough resources to make any great, military difference in the 
war or to spark jealousy among his peers, subordinates, or rivals; difficulties aplenty 
arose, but largely over theoretical issues and personalities rather than actual, fierce 
competition for resources. After six months of infrastructure improvements, a 
regularization of supply channels, and with the Air Transport Command’s assumption of 
control over the Hump airlift, tonnage began to flow across the Himalayas in quantities 
sufficient to allow either large-scale aerial activity or useful military training activity to 
occur within China proper; both could not be sustained, however, and the decision about 
which course to pursue pitted the local commanders against each other throughout the 
war. Lieutenant General Stilwell represented an orthodox, western-oriented military point 
of view with his desire to recreate the Chinese Army as an aggressive and capable 
instrument with which to engage Japanese forces within China; Stilwell hoped to drive 
the Chinese Army to the coast of China, capture a major port, and link-up with the Allied 
drive across the Pacific Ocean in order to blockade, bombard, and eventually invade 
Japan. Brigadier General Chennault represented a less orthodox view; he hoped to ignore 
the Japanese Imperial Army and to strike directly at Japanese air, naval, and industrial 
power using air power created by the United States and based in China. These two men 
found both support and opposition in Chungking, Washington, and their various 
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headquarters and waged a struggle that eventually reached the President of the United 
States but that did not end even with his decisions on the matter. 
The American personalities of the China-Burma-India Theater can be roughly 
divided into three categories: diplomatic, air force, and military. Lieutenant General 
Stilwell, the major military personality, occupied several critical roles simultaneously that 
both gave him tremendous influence and complicated his efforts to accomplish any task; 
Stilwell served as Generalissimo Chiang’s Chief of Staff for Allied forces in China, the 
commander of all American forces in the theater, and the commander of the Chinese 
Army in India. As his Chief of Staff, Chiang expected Stilwell to secure aid for China 
and, when Stilwell exercised his judgment in supporting requests only for that aid which 
could, in his opinion, be effectively used, and then when even those supplies often failed 
to arrive, Chiang began to lose trust in Stilwell. Besides Stilwell’s inability to deliver 
Lend-Lease supplies in either quantity or quality acceptable to Chiang, the Chinese leader 
also took offense to Stilwell’s colorful language as it concerned the performance and 
personalities of Chiang and his subordinates; because of the two issues, Chiang began to 
obstruct most of Stilwell’s projects and eventually to agitate for Stilwell’s removal from 
duty, finally succeeding in this aim in October 1944. Despite Chiang’s opposition, and 
after some weeding out of undesirable commanders, Stilwell enjoyed relative freedom in 
his activities as commander of the Chinese Army in India, due in part to his ability to 
arrange for supplies and equipment, including tanks that could be secured in India but 
that could not be flown over the Himalayas, for that organization, and poured much of his 
labor into training and employing that force to clear a new land route through Japanese-
held northern Burma and into China. Concurrent with the creation and use of the Chinese 
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Army in India, Stilwell commanded American service forces that gradually improved the 
lines of communication within India and built the Ledo Road from India to China and the 
famous Merrill’s Marauders that helped to clear northern Burma in 1944. Finally, another 
key to Stilwell’s power lay in his trusting relationship with Chief of Staff of the United 
States Army General George Marshall, who supported Stilwell in the face of growing 
opposition from both a diverse group of Washingtonians and businessman-adventurers 
known as the China lobby and growing concern on the part of President Roosevelt. 
Whatever his eventual success on the ground in India and Burma, however, and 
regardless of the confidence that Marshall placed in Stilwell, the delay of Stilwell’s 
success until 1944 did not help to instill confidence in the American air units in the 
theater that Stilwell understood their problems or would employ them correctly.36 
Lieutenant General Stilwell’s relationship with the various Tenth Air Force 
commanders proved successful but relations between Stilwell and Brigadier General 
Chennault proved unpleasant at best. Generals Brereton and Naiden served as 
commanders of the Tenth only briefly, with much of their activity related to enlarging the 
embryonic airlift over the Himalayas; they found little cause for conflict with Stilwell, 
who recognized the airlift as both a tiny effort and as a necessity. As the Tenth grew and 
after Brigadier General Bissell took command in August 1942, Stilwell maintained 
cooperative relations with his subordinates; Bissell, and later Generals Howard Davidson 
and George Stratemeyer, provided adequate aerial protection and support to both the 
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airlift and to both Stilwell’s and British military activities in Burma; Stilwell found little 
cause for complaint and allowed the men relatively free rein to conduct activities as they 
saw fit. For his part Bissell, who commanded the Tenth until January 1944, proved more 
of a burden to Chennault than to Stilwell; Bissell acted the part of a responsible, technical 
leader by allocating to Chennault’s China Air Task Force only those numbers and types 
of aircraft, generally small numbers of such obsolescent aircraft as the P-40 rather than 
more advanced gas guzzlers like the P-38, that the airlift could support. By actions of this 
type, Bissell incurred Chennault’s and Generalissimo Chiang’s disfavor, which fact led 
first to the creation of the Fourteenth Air Force under Chennault’s command, as a 
coequal to Bissell, and later contributed to the removal of Bissell from command of the 
Tenth, though he went on to promotion and success in other assignments. Chennault, the 
civilian leader of the American Volunteer Group who was quickly recalled to active duty 
as commander of the China Air Task Force and then promoted to commander, Fourteenth 
Air Force, enjoyed an unusual power in his struggles against other American 
commanders; Chennault enjoyed a close, personal relationship with Chiang. Chiang and 
Chennault agreed that the best way for the Allies to defeat Japan was to employ massed 
air power from Chinese bases and the duo did their best to discredit and remove any 
commander who believed otherwise; Stilwell, Bissell, and Ambassador Clarence Gauss 
gave way to the machinations of this duo and were replaced by Lieutenant General Albert 
Wedemeyer, Chennault himself, and Ambassador General Patrick Hurley respectively, 
each of whom held the Kuomintang in higher regard and struggled more vigorously to 
gain aid for China than did his predecessor.37 
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For their part, those Americans most familiar with China generally expressed the 
most reservations about aiding Generalissimo Chiang, while visiting dignitaries, such as 
Wendell Willkie, Vice President Henry Wallace, and Generals Wedemeyer and Hurley, 
who first experienced China as roving emissaries, tended to see only the best aspects of 
the Kuomintang regime and thus received and passed on requests for additional aid in a 
more favorable manner. While Wedemeyer and Hurley later came to understand the 
limitations upon American influence in China, short-term visitors never experienced the 
decrepit state of the regular Chinese armies and never felt frustration as Chiang secretly 
countermanded orders that Lieutenant General Stilwell issued to Chinese units; visitors 
saw only demonstration units and heard only from selected government officials; in the 
views of such visitors, China required only material aid in order to prosecute the war 
against Japan effectively. Career diplomats and military attaches, such as Lieutenant 
General Stilwell, Ambassador Gauss, and Foreign Service Officer John Service, knew 
from long experience just how bad the situation of the Kuomintang was in the 
countryside and on the front lines, favored conditional assistance based upon reform of 
government and effective military performance, and occasionally advocated overtures to 
groups less strongly wed to Chiang and more open to reform; these men, however, also 
carried little weight in the wartime governmental system in Washington. Men such as 
these believed, despite the fact that few listened to or respected their opinions, that 
sending unconditional aid to China was a waste because Chiang would wait out the war 
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against Japan while hording supplies for his post-war war against the communists. Gauss 
also labored under another difficulty in relating to the Kuomintang: as ambassador, he 
lacked any noticeable power or influence because his opinions so obviously carried little 
weight in Washington and because he played no role in determining the amount or type 
of aid that flowed to China; the Chinese learned that Gauss was unimportant and his 
presence became an irrelevancy because he proved unable to deal with anyone of 
importance in either Chungking or Washington. President Roosevelt’s personal beliefs, 
including familial ties to the China trade and the Open Door policy, and his habit of 
formulating policy based on personal emissaries rather than State Department knowledge, 
led him to believe the optimists’ reports about China and to formulate the policies of the 
United States such that Chiang became the sole official benefactor of American aid to 
China, the goal of which was to build up Kuomintang China into a major power which 
could supplant Japan and fend off the Soviet Union, Britain, and France in the post-war 
world.38 
The personal beliefs of American leaders, including President Roosevelt, 
regarding the Chinese, and Asian peoples in general, helped to form the policies of the 
United States in the China-Burma-India Theater. Chinese nationalism began to develop 
among Chinese elites as western powers began to forcibly open China to economic and 
political exploitation, a process that spurred the downfall of the Manchu regime and that 
likewise spurred the American Open Door policy. The flow of American missionaries 
and merchants to China, the corresponding flow of culture and material back to the 
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United States, and the Chinese acceptance of extraterritoriality led to a general, but not 
universal, belief in the United States that the culture of the United States had proved itself 
superior to that of China and that Chinese nationalism and conversion to Christianity 
reflected an informal acceptance of China’s position as inferior to the west. When the 
United States then refunded indemnities from the Boxer Rebellion and failed to carve 
itself a sphere of influence in China, both unlike Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and 
Portugal, and pressured other governments to reduce their exploitation of the Chinese, 
many Americans began to believe that the United States was a protector and mentor to a 
budding Chinese democracy. Kuomintang propaganda supported these beliefs, despite 
the realities that the Kuomintang actually resembled Nazi Germany more closely than the 
United States in its internal disorganization and that democracy played essentially no role 
governing China. The result, in the United States, was that while the government slowly 
but never fully came to recognize that the Kuomintang did not represent the Chinese 
people, the American public did not, during World War II, realize any such thing; 
furthermore, even when the government realized that the Kuomintang would never make 
peace with Japan regardless of what aid America sent, feelings of guilt over not aiding 
China sooner or to a larger degree mitigated any desire to cast aside Chiang as an ally. In 
effect, the government of the United States trapped itself into supporting an ally, the 
prestige of which it helped to build-up without justification, until American support for 
the Kuomintang had little to do with winning the war, less to do with winning the peace, 
and everything to do with avoiding embarrassment. Under such circumstances, infamous 
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post-war squabbles in the United States about whom “lost” China are far more 
comprehensible.39 
Without having yet realized the bottomless nature of the Chinese requirement for 
aid and the unwillingness of the Kuomintang to wage an aggressive war against Japan, 
American reinforcements flowed into India more rapidly in early 1943, causing the 
deactivation of the China Air Task Force and its replacement by the Fourteenth Air 
Force, under newly promoted Major General Chennault, on March 10, 1943. The 
Fourteenth Air Force took responsibility for United States’ air activity in China, leaving 
the Tenth Air Force to operate only in India and Burma, and continued to grow 
throughout 1943. In the fall of 1943, the Chinese-American Composite Wing, with one 
new medium bombardment and two new pursuit groups, activated in China under the 
command of the Fourteenth. As the Fourteenth expanded, the inadequate tonnage of the 
Hump airlift provided the main factor that limited the Fourteenth’s size.40 
China proved the most difficult and expensive area of the world in which to 
operate a force dependent on America for equipment; no theater on either side of World 
War II used a longer supply line. The line of communication between the United States 
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and China relied on scarce merchant ships crossing either the submarine infested Atlantic 
Ocean or the vast Pacific Ocean and then slipping past the occasional raiders and 
submarines that prowled the Indian Ocean. In the meantime, as the supplies traveled to 
India, the various British, Chinese, and American forces in the theater occasionally 
squabbled over allocation of the rare and precious material. Supplies destined for China 
or the Chinese crossed India first by using three separate gauges of rickety, low-capacity 
railroads, being transshipped by hand at each gauge change, and then via scarce river 
shipping to reach either airfields near the Himalayan Mountains or Lieutenant General 
Stilwell’s training camps and battlefields in eastern India and Burma. Finally, after 
sometimes months of travel, occasional sabotage, and frequent pilfering, the supplies 
destined for China flew on precious aircraft, powered by imported fuel, over the tallest 
mountain range in the world. Once in China, a network of aircraft, trucks, river shipping, 
railroads, and human and animal portage distributed the material to its final 
destinations.41 
As the Allies built more ships, American factories produced more war material, 
and Allied navies swept Axis forces from the seas, the oceanic leg of the journey from 
the United States to India became ever more crowded, faster, and easier. Such bounty led 
to difficulties further along in the supply route as congestion in Indian ports and railroad 
yards delayed traffic to the interior of India, not least because British Imperial planners 
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designed the Indian rail system and ports to move high volume, low weight loads of tea 
leaves and consumer goods rather than boxcar loads of quarter ton bombs and cases of 
bullets. Port capacities grew as engineers improved them continually and, after 
significant trouble, United States Army railroad transportation units upgraded the 
relevant portions of the Indian railways to a much higher standard of utility. The United 
States Air Transport Command and the China National Aviation Corporation likewise 
slowly increased the number and size of their aircraft and bases. Finally, in 1945, General 
Stilwell opened his long-sought overland supply route to provide yet another path along 
which to transport supplies to China.42 
In April 1943, in response to the improving logistical situation in China, and 
using the impressive results achieved by his forces to bolster his cause, Major General 
Chennault proposed a plan far more grandiose than the one upon which Generals Arnold, 
Stilwell, Bissell, and he agreed upon only two months before. Chennault’s April 1943 
plan called for nothing less than the defeat of Japan to be achieved using aerial forces 
based in China. Chennault planned to increase the size of the Fourteenth Air Force and to 
use it to attack Japanese shipping on the Yangtze River and along the China coast and 
then to direct the Fourteenth against the Japanese air forces when they tried to protect 
Japanese ships. Chennault believed that full use of the ever increasing tonnage delivered 
via the Hump airlift would allow the Fourteenth to operate at nearly full efficiency and, 
eventually, would allow further air units to bolster the Fourteenth in China and make 
possible the nebulous expansion of the Fourteenth’s efforts that Chennault stated could 
win the war. In order to gain the supplies required to operate the Fourteenth at a 
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substantially increased tempo, Chennault planned to drastically reduce the flow of 
supplies to other activities in China. For security, Chennault relied upon the Chinese 
Army to protect the Fourteenth’s airbases, with support from the Fourteenth where and 
when necessary, in case the Japanese Imperial Army tried to stop the Fourteenth’s 
offensive by attacking its airfields.43 
Lieutenant General Stilwell summed up the objections to Major General 
Chennault’s plan; he said, in effect, that the plan could never work. Stilwell believed that 
the Fourteenth Air Force lacked the size to inflict serious damage upon either the 
Japanese merchant marine or the Japanese air forces and that the Japanese could and 
would use their army to capture any of Chennault’s airfields that they might find it 
convenient to occupy.  Stilwell acknowledged that the Fourteenth could sting the 
Japanese but discounted the ability of the Chinese Army to stop the Japanese from 
evicting the Fourteenth from China. Chennault believed that the Chinese armies, if given 
United States’ air support, could hold back and even advance against the Japanese 
Imperial Army; Stilwell held no such delusions.44 
 The term “Chinese Army,” though commonly used, served as a less than accurate 
title by which to address the multitude of ground forces that Chennault believed could 
protect his airfields. The three hundred plus division equivalents of the Chinese Army 
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divided their loyalties between the utterly corrupt, heavily bureaucratized, and faction 
ridden Kuomintang and twelve war area commanders. The twelve war area commanders 
possessed generally low military competence and often held their jobs because they or 
their fathers headed their own private states (occasionally and vaguely corresponding to 
Chinese provinces) in the 1920s. These men individually decided to join Generalissimo 
Chiang’s anti-warlord crusade during the late 1920s in exchange for a free hand in 
running their provinces. Politicians and provincial governors, they first ripped China 
apart after the Manchu Dynasty fell and then nominally joined with Chiang to put China 
back together again fifteen years later. These facts did not surprise planners in the United 
States, who received constant reports from skilled military and diplomatic observers that 
the political aspects of the chain of command, stemming both from Kuomintang and 
warlord loyalty, continued far below the level of the war area commanders.45 
Three armies composed a group army and themselves usually comprised three 
divisions each, within the organization of the Chinese Army. War area commanders or 
some faction of the Kuomintang chose group army commanders for their loyalty and for 
their prominence in provincial politics. At the army and division levels, loyalty to the 
group army commander and either the war area commander or a faction of the 
Kuomintang determined who would command. Within divisions and lower level units the 
system stayed the same but with loyalty owed to division commanders rather than to 
anyone at army or higher levels. At no level of command did a candidate’s military 
ability prove more important than loyalty when deciding who might occupy a given post. 
At every level of command, a commander worked primarily to increase his own personal 
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power (in the form of men and equipment and the prestige and income that came from 
them) and to meticulously avoid any activity that might cost him that power.46 
The deployment and employment of the Chinese Army resulted directly from its 
system of command. A core of about thirty, well-equipped and absolutely loyal divisions 
enforced Generalissimo Chiang’s authority and assured the loyalty of the war area 
commanders, but rarely fought the Japanese. War area commanders usually kept their 
forces inside their personal geographic areas of control without regard to the overall 
military situation; Chiang kept some of his forces in the rear of each war area to ensure 
loyalty. Unit commanders, from the war area level all the way down to division 
commanders, often refused to aid their neighbors in fending off Japanese attacks because 
loyalty extended only upwards, not laterally, and a commander gained nothing by joining 
a fight that did not immediately involve him. Upper level commanders might order one 
unit to aid another in a battle nearby but even if orders arrived on time and made military 
sense the recipients often ignored them or carried them out with such incompetence and 
procrastination as to render the orders irrelevant. Commanders often simply proved 
unwilling to risk their units, effectively their personal property, by moving them into 
danger.47 
The Chinese Air Force operated in much the same fashion as the Chinese Army. 
In his October 13, 1942 letter to Lieutenant General Arnold, the commander of the 
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United States Army Air Force, Brigadier General Bissell of the Tenth Air Force noted 
that the Chinese Air Force was a, “national ambition, not a fighting organization.” The 
Air Force served primarily as a political tool, consuming tremendous numbers of men 
into ground organizations that, while large, did not always know what their duties were or 
how to perform them. Between lack of fuel and ammunition and the lack of desire to 
fight, the Chinese Air Force contributed little to the struggle against Japan except for 
occasionally loaning the United States Army Air Force fuel, bombs, and ground crews. 
Of course, the Army Air Force then trained the crews and paid back the supplies later and 
at a premium. The Chinese Air Force leadership also intermittently attempted to drain 
personnel and equipment from the United States-sponsored, equipped, and commanded 
Chinese-American Composite Wing into the Chinese Air Force.48 
 Communism proved another factor that helped to divide the supposed unity of the 
Chinese Army. The Chinese communists fielded two armies during World War II and, 
even though unofficial communist relations with the United States proved cordial, the 
communists spent significant time and energy fighting pro-Kuomintang Chinese in 
addition to waging a successful guerrilla war against Japanese and Chinese puppet forces. 
The Kuomintang viewed the communists as a more serious long-term threat than the 
Japanese, whom the United States would certainly defeat regardless of what the Chinese 
did, and directed a large portion of the Chinese Army’s effort during the war toward both 
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stockpiling supplies and cordoning off and even attacking communist forces and base 
areas.49 
 On a more personal level, the Chinese Army proved at once more admirable and 
more pathetic than Chinese commanders. Chinese soldiers often acted bravely and 
usually endured their exceptionally poor circumstances with admirable fortitude. 
Unfortunately for the soldiers, even by Chinese standards of the day their circumstances 
were truly appalling. The weakness of the Chinese logistical system crippled the already 
poorly led military. China possessed little functioning industry and some of China’s main 
food producing areas lay under enemy occupation. A wholly inadequate airlift brought 
China’s only imports from the outside world and within China the lines of 
communication, disconnected rivers and utterly inadequate railroads, failed to even reach 
vast areas of the country.50 
The Kuomintang almost always distributed the few supplies that China saved, 
produced, or imported, to the most loyal of leaders. They, in turn, then stored for the 
supplies for eventual use in emergencies that never seemed to arrive, regardless of how 
bad the current situation might be. In the meantime the typical Chinese soldier lived and 
died while badly clothed, weak and night-blind from malnutrition, and having no choice 
but to plunder the farms of his fellow Chinese in a quest for food. Virtually no Chinese 
units possessed anything approaching their authorized equipment levels of small arms, 
artillery, or vehicles.51 
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 Lieutenant General Stilwell, a former military attaché in China, held no illusions 
as to the quality of Chinese forces. In the 1920s, the German General Hans von Seekt 
found that, “lack of centralized authority, ill-defined powers and responsibilities, and the 
absence of unity of command were weaknesses prevalent in the Chinese Army.” 
Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer found the same problems with Chinese forces 
inside China after assuming Stilwell’s position in October 1944. Despite the obstacles, 
however, Stilwell planned to transform the Chinese Army by adding training and a 
sufficiency of modern equipment to the already admirable bravery and endurance of the 
common Chinese soldier.52 
The Burma disaster stranded nine of China’s best divisions south of the 
Himalayan Mountains; Lieutenant General Stilwell planned to use them as a model for 
what he hoped to create, on a larger scale, in China proper. After training and outfitting, 
these men spearheaded Stilwell’s drive to clear a ground supply route into China from 
India. While that plan unfolded, Stilwell hoped to begin training sequential groups of 
thirty Chinese divisions each in China, using whatever equipment the airlift could fly in 
from India. One hundred twenty really effective Chinese divisions served as the interim 
goal of Stilwell’s plan to secure bases within air bombardment range of Japan and a port 
through which to directly import troops and supplies into China. Stilwell planned to 
speed up the timetable for victory over Japan by building and using a new kind of 
Chinese Army.53 
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 No one with both sufficient stature and knowledge existed to point out the 
weakness in Lieutenant General Stilwell’s plan. Generalissimo Chiang and the 
Kuomintang did not want to reform or properly train their ground forces and were going 
to try, whenever possible, to avoid even giving equipment to units loyal to the various 
warlords. An effective military posed an unacceptable threat to the dominance of the 
Kuomintang in China because any general who suddenly came to command even a small 
number of trained and decently equipped divisions could probably set himself up as ruler 
of much or all of free China. The Kuomintang felt secure in the knowledge that its loyal 
units possessed training and equipment superior to that of their provincial rivals, and that 
relative strength served as the limit upon how strong the Kuomintang allowed any of its 
army to become. The Chinese Army kept the Kuomintang in power for four and a half 
years against the whole of the Japanese Empire and after the United States entered the 
war the same army could protect China until the United States or someone else ultimately 
defeated Japan.54 
 In search of the quickest way to accomplish the defeat of the Japanese Empire 
without undermining or embarrassing his government, Generalissimo Chiang chose to 
support Major General Chennault’s plan for action in China. President Roosevelt, 
anxious both to help Chiang and to take the chance of defeating Japan so quickly and at 
such a low cost, overrode the opinions of most of his military advisers and chose to make 
the Chennault plan the primary focus of support from the United States. Roosevelt placed 
Lieutenant General Stilwell’s plan second in the order of priority, essentially starving the 
program inside China of supplies, but allowing Stilwell to form the Chinese Army in 
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India into a formidable fighting force and to lead it back into Burma. Roosevelt further 
directed that both Stilwell and Chennault keep the integrity and military participation of 
China as their first objectives. Roosevelt’s decision set in motion the chain of events that 
led to the United States Army Air Force conducting three strategic air offensives in and 
from China in World War II.55 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE FOURTEENTH’S FIRST OFFENSIVE 
 
The Japanese Imperial Army preempted the Fourteenth Air Force’s offensive by 
launching a ground offensive in China in mid-1943. While Major General Chennault 
amassed forces and supplies in China, Japanese ground forces began to raid deep into the 
Chinese heartland in order to collect railway equipment and river shipping. Japanese 
forces also made smaller, more permanent gains in several areas of particularly high 
strategic and economic value. In May 1943, even before beginning Chennault’s planned 
offensive, the Fourteenth found itself drawn into a steadily increasing program of 
interdiction and air support missions. Without this aid, the hapless Chinese Army stood 
no chance against the Japanese Army and even with the aid could only slow the Japanese 
advance. In 1943, Japanese forces destroyed a number of the Fourteenth’s airfields, 
moved about China almost at will, and otherwise fulfilled their objectives.56 
 Despite the ongoing Japanese demonstration of the vulnerability of China and the 
Fourteenth Air Force, Major General Chennault began a small but effective anti-shipping 
operation on July 9, 1943, and the Fourteenth claimed 43,000 tons of shipping sunk and 
nearly double that damaged in the first 30 days. To conduct this offensive, Chennault 
employed the Fourteenth’s full bomber strength; the Three Hundred Seventy-Fourth 
Squadron of the Three Hundred Eighth Bombardment Group (Heavy), flying four-engine, 
B-24 heavy bombers, and the Eleventh Squadron of the Three Hundred Forty-first 
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Bombardment Group (Medium), flying twin-engine B-25 medium bombers. Three other 
squadrons of the Three Hundred Eighth, under the command of the Tenth Air Force in 
India, supported the effort part-time by occasionally flying supplies from India to China, 
and spent the remainder of their time attacking Japanese-held factories, rail yards, and 
ports in Burma and Southeast Asia. The United States Navy also sent a unit to aid China 
and the Fourteenth; a group of intelligence specialists worked with the Fourteenth’s 
headquarters in the tasks of photographic interpretation, communication, and intelligence; 
Mine Detail Fourteen worked with the Three Hundred Eighth Bombardment Group to 
conduct mine warfare; and Naval Group China, later called the Sino-American 
Cooperative Organization, worked with Generalissimo Chiang’s Gestapo-like secret 
police, headed by the notorious gangster General Tai Li, to overhaul and energize the 
Kuomintang’s repressive effort against political dissidents and communists within 
Kuomintang controlled territory.57 
 Japanese shipping did not suffer, indeed could not have suffered, heavily as a 
result of the Fourteenth’s attacks. The Japanese merchant marine used only twenty 
thousand tons of shipping to support the Japanese Imperial Army in China in 1943, 
compared to one million one hundred ten thousand tons of shipping to support the whole 
of the Japanese Army. Doubtless, the Japanese merchant marine used further small 
quantities of shipping to support Japanese naval forces in China, and certainly vast 
quantities of economic shipping plied the waters between Japan and Manchuria, Tientsin, 
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and Tsingtao, but most of that never sailed into areas under the Fourteenth’s attack. 
Finally, because the Fourteenth perpetually lacked fuel and spare parts, the Fourteenth’s 
patrols rarely sought ships in open waters and so never found most ships bound for 
Japanese-held Southeast Asia, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies. The Japanese 
merchant marine did not lose anything like the quantity of shipping that the Fourteenth 
claimed because if they had then the Fourteenth would have run out of targets before 
reaching the second month of the campaign.58 
 Post-war analysis and record comparison confirmed data available in 1943 and 
revealed the depth of the folly of those who believed the outrageous claims that the 
Fourteenth Air Force made in regard to its attacks against Japanese shipping. Overall in 
World War II, China-based aircraft exaggerated their claims of definitely sunk ships by 
six hundred percent, by one thousand percent if including claims of “probable.” The 
average Japanese merchant vessel engaged in China and attacked by the Fourteenth could 
be taken to have been of seven hundred fifty tons displacement, though this is a 
generously large estimate given the coastal and river routes that the traffic took, the vast 
numbers of vessels of two hundred fifty tons or less in the Japanese merchant marine, and 
the fact that the Fourteenth achieved its best success against traffic not at sea but on the 
Yangtze River. The Fourteenth might have made one hundred sorties against shipping 
targets in July 1943, another very generous estimate given the small size of the force 
engaged, the supply difficulties encountered, the constant call for ground support and 
counter-air missions, and the fact that even a year later and with a far more ample flow of 
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supplies a larger force definitely managed just over half that number of anti-shipping 
sorties. If we take both of these estimates as fact then the Fourteenth’s claims imply that 
for every two aircraft that took off on anti-shipping sorties, an enemy ship sank; the claim 
was and is absurd on its face.59 
 The Fourteenth Air Force failed to seriously degrade the Japanese merchant 
marine either to the degree expounded upon by Major General Chennault in his proposals 
or even to any strategically significant degree, for a variety of reasons. Chennault planned 
to receive specific and increasing quantities of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts that the 
Hump airlift failed to deliver despite efforts that cost the Air Transport Command one 
hundred fifty-five aircraft to accidents alone from June through December 1943. Air 
Transport Command and the Tenth and Fourteenth Air Force’s transport and bomber 
aircraft delivered three thousand tons in July, finally reached their March 1943 goal of 
four thousand tons in August of that year and their seven thousand ton July goal only in 
October 1943. The Fourteenth’s troop carrier aircraft then consumed some of those 
supplies while distributing the remainder to airfields across East and South China. The 
resulting supply shortage immediately cut the number of potential sorties per medium 
bomber by nearly half and per heavy bomber by close to two-thirds. Of necessity for its 
own survival and in order to support China, the Fourteenth then directed much of its 
effort against Japanese ground forces, often in support of Chinese ground forces. Tactical 
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necessity then combined with the Fourteenth’s mission of protecting China to force the 
Fourteenth to spend a great deal of its remaining stockpiles in attacking Japanese aerial 
strength both aloft and on the ground. Try as they might, the men of the Fourteenth could 
only spend a small fraction of their ordnance against Japanese ships, the supposed 
primary target of their efforts.60 
 The best efforts of the Fourteenth Air Force, however exaggerated the claims or 
unsuccessful the results, contributed to Allied victory in World War II. The Fourteenth’s 
attacks against Japanese ground forces killed men and destroyed equipment and facilities 
without which the Japanese Imperial Army lacked some of its previous strength. When 
the Fourteenth shot down or bombed enemy aircraft or naval vessels the results, however 
small compared to claims or expectations, advanced the Allied cause and sent the Axis 
spiraling closer to defeat. Likewise, and especially relevantly, when the Fourteenth 
destroyed, damaged, or delayed a Japanese merchant vessel the result contributed directly 
to weakening the Japanese economy and thus helped Allied forces to eventually 
emasculate of the Japanese ability to wage war. 
 That the Fourteenth Air Force contributed to Allied victory in World War II does 
little to mitigate the ill-advised nature of the strategic plans that committed some of the 
Fourteenth’s resources to China in the first place. The Three Hundred Eighth 
Bombardment Group moved its several dozen B-24 bombers, known as the PB-4Y’s to 
the United States Navy and the most effective American anti-submarine aircraft of the 
war, from the United States to Asia in 1942, a year during which Axis submarines 
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destroyed well over five hundred merchant vessels off the East and South coasts of the 
United States and in the Bahamas and Caribbean Sea areas. The United States Navy 
estimated that five hundred twin- and four-engine aircraft could provide adequate aerial 
coverage of the waters off the East and South coasts of the United States but the United 
States Army and Navy together deployed only three hundred twenty-six such aircraft 
there in July 1942 and only four hundred seventy-three as late as February 1943. The 
United States military also drew the task of protecting the Caribbean Sea during the 
division of anti-submarine labor between the armed forces of the United States, Canada, 
Great Britain, and the other Atlantic area allies and devoted an even less adequate 
number of aircraft to that area than to the Atlantic seaboard of the United States. Beyond 
these areas, the United States military also exercised responsibility for, and deployed 
inadequate assets in, the area of Iceland and did not contribute adequate assets to 
operations over the Bay of Biscay, through which numerous Axis submarines passed at 
both the beginnings and ends of their patrols from bases in occupied France and where 
Army Air Force B-24 crews earned the admiration of the British Coastal Command, 
which requested that the two Army squadrons not be replaced by a Navy force because of 
the Army’s effectiveness and cooperation. Finally, in November 1942, Allied forces 
invaded French North Africa and subsequently drew upon insufficient stocks of anti-
submarine aircraft to cover the western Mediterranean Sea and the portion of the Atlantic 
Ocean off of Morocco as well.61 
 For every Allied country, possibly excepting China, the importance of the Battle 
of the Atlantic greatly outweighed the importance of the campaign for China; such is both 
common sense and common knowledge. Even for the Kuomintang, the Battle of the 
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Atlantic should have been of greater immediate importance than the battle within China 
because the whole Allied cause depended upon victory in the Battle of the Atlantic; the 
results of the war, had the Axis proved victorious in the Atlantic, would have been 
incomparably dire for the Allies, including Kuomintang-led China. Even a delayed Allied 
predominance in the Atlantic would have greatly harmed the Chinese people and 
government by reducing the power of- and delaying- every action against the Japanese 
Empire or in favor of China. In the United States, every sort of production suffered each 
time an Allied merchant vessel sank, and each such sinking thus delayed the war against 
Japan and the flow of aid to China. From the point of view of military strategy, Major 
General Chennault ought not have had the assets in China to conduct his 1943 offensive; 
those aircraft should have been hunting Axis forces in the Atlantic Ocean. 
 Tactics provide no great argument for the Three Hundred Eighth Bombardment 
Group to serve in Asia instead of in the Battle of the Atlantic. Assuredly, the Three 
Hundred Eighth did not train to hunt submarines, but initially neither did any of the other 
one hundred forty-one aircraft crewed by the United States Army Air Force that patrolled 
the East coast of the United States in July 1942 and in increasing amounts later in the 
war; they learned and so would have the Three Hundred Eighth. Certainly attacking 
submarines is a difficult task, especially when flying a huge, four-engine aircraft; yet the 
Three Hundred Eighth hunted Japanese ships as their primary mission in China from July 
1943 almost through the end of World War II. Hunting submarines certainly requires 
more patience than hunting surface ships, but the targets are both narrow, neither is 
overly long, and both actively maneuver in two dimensions; the tasks are more similar to 
each other than to attacking factories and rail yards as the Three Hundred Eighth trained 
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to do. Beyond this, in the continental United States the Three Hundred Eighth would have 
enjoyed a relative tidal wave of logistical support, superior weather forecasting, and 
possessed enough aviation fuel to fly more than three or four training or operational 
missions per month, thus learning its tasks more rapidly and conducting more, and more 
effective, missions than it did in China.62 
 Within China, the Fourteenth Air Force and Major General Chennault’s plan 
provided little concrete support to either the Kuomintang Party or the Chinese people in 
general. The Fourteenth certainly provided a degree of morale support and thus boosted 
the credibility of the Kuomintang among some segments of the Chinese population, but 
such benefits are difficult to quantify and, given reports from Ambassador Gauss and 
various Foreign Service Officers at the time and the subsequent rapid victory of the 
Chinese Communists in the Chinese Civil War, easy to qualify. Within the operations of 
the Fourteenth Air Force a clear, common sense division can be made regarding which 
activities supported the Kuomintang relatively more or less effectively. Certainly, when 
the Fourteenth intercepted Japanese aircraft over land and shot some down or scattered 
their bombing pattern, the Chinese living in the target areas benefited and often realized 
that they owed some portion of their salvation to the Kuomintang. Similarly, when the 
Fourteenth attacked anything Japanese within sight of the Chinese, the Chinese saw the 
results and came to believe more strongly in the eventual victory of the Kuomintang and 
its allies. 
Of less benefit to Chinese morale, Fourteenth Air Force bombings of Japanese 
ships out of sight of land presented fewer opportunities for Chinese civilians to learn 
about the attacks and fewer reasons to be glad of them. Imponderable also is the morale 
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effect upon Chinese civilians who saw American planes, especially heavy bombers that 
only flew a few missions per month for lack of fuel and spare parts, sitting idly in parking 
slots while Chinese refugees straggled past and Chinese villages burned in the distance. 
The very aircraft that flew least in China could have served best over the Atlantic Ocean 
while the aircraft that flew most in China would have served little purpose in the long 
distance campaign against Axis submarines. The single-, and less so the twin-engine, 
aircraft of the Fourteenth best served the military and morale goals that the Fourteenth 
Air Force sought to achieve; the Three Hundred Eighth Bombardment Group wasted its 
aircraft on mainland Asia. 
 Economically, the Fourteenth Air Force and the Hump airlift essentially did not 
help the Chinese people at all. Factories in the United States printed, and the Hump airlift 
delivered, notorious quantities of paper money to the Chinese government, helping the 
government to maintain short-term solvency at the expense of helping to fuel inflation 
that caused the real exchange rate to spiral from sixty Chinese Nationalist Yuan to the 
American dollar in March 1943 up to two thousand Yuan to the dollar in June 1945. Such 
activity, if conducted by an unfriendly government, amounts to economic warfare and in 
this case certainly contributed to the alienation of the Chinese people from the 
Kuomintang, thus working against the very goals that the United States strove to achieve 
in China. Further, the United States and, to a lesser extent Great Britain, delivered or 
handed over quantities of dollars, pounds, and gold bullion valued at over half a billion 
dollars to Kuomintang leaders, either to placate them, such as when Operation Buccaneer 
against the Andaman Islands was cancelled, or simply to make them happy; such 
generosity is estimated to have been ninety percent wasted due to corruption and the 
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remaining ten percent of the funds simply chased an already insufficient supply of goods 
either within China or in Allied countries. On the plus side for the Chinese economy, on 
rare occasions the Hump airlift and occasional bombers smuggled consumer goods into 
China and carried Chinese exports such as hog bristles and raw tungsten back from China 
to India for use by Allied economies; such activity at least maintained some Chinese 
external commerce but amounted to less than a drop in the bucket of Chinese needs.63 
 Militarily, too, Fourteenth Air Force heavy bombers, unlike their smaller brethren, 
contributed rather negatively than positively to the durability of the Kuomintang 
government. The Fourteenth’s fighter and dive and medium bomber aircraft contributed 
to delaying, harassing, and weakening Japanese ground forces by giving air support to 
Chinese forces and by battlefield interdiction; these activities clearly aided the Chinese 
military and government. The Fourteenth’s heavy bombers concentrated upon targets 
further back along the Japanese lines of communication and reaped a less useful 
whirlwind. Strikes by heavy bombers damaged enough Japanese ships, planes, and 
facilities to catch the attention of Japanese leaders without causing enough damage to 
significantly hinder any Japanese counter-stroke. The Fourteenth’s anti-shipping strikes 
presaged without quickly becoming a serious Allied threat from airbases in East and 
South China to Japanese merchant shipping links between Northeast Asia and Southeast 
Asia and the East Indies. Partly to counter these longer range attacks, Imperial Japanese 
Army leaders began, in September 1943, to plan an eighteen month ground offensive 
                                                 
63Both the Kuomintang and the Communists also allowed Chinese to legally trade between 
Chinese and Japanese controlled areas of China, to the benefit of all four parties, if not to the Allied war 
effort as a whole. 1LT C. Tarrillion, History, HQ. & HQ. SQ., 14th Air Force, in microfilm A8306 
(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Force Historical Research Agency); Tunner, Hump, 43–66; Thorne, 
Allies of a Kind, passim; Romanus and Sunderland, Time Runs Out, 6–12. 
 
 60
aimed at Fourteenth Air Force airfields and certain other targets: Operation Ichigo. Major 
General Chennault’s plan and its implementation thus sparked a massive Japanese 
offensive that China might have otherwise have avoided and in any case had no hope of 
stopping. General Arnold and the Operations Division of the War Department of the 
United States saw the problem too late and attempted to implement a non-provocation 
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In her book Stilwell and the American Experience in China, historian and author 
Barbara Tuchman describes the essential strategic objectives of Ichigo. 
     Japan’s reach had exceeded her grasp, but though the edges crumbled, 
she was not going to let go in China. The overall aim of ICHIGO was to 
consolidate Japan’s position on the mainland by fusing a solid line of 
communications from Tientsin to Canton, and by eliminating the American 
airbases.  Indirectly it may have represented one last effort to bring about a 
surrender of the Chinese Government.65 
 
The Japanese seemed almost to take their cue from Major General Chennault. Again 
according to Tuchman, “He [Chennault] began his air offensive in the fall of 1943, and 
the results were disastrous.  As soon as the Japanese began to feel the effects of the air 
strikes, their armies in east China moved (as predicted)[by Lieutenant General Stilwell] 
on Chennault’s air bases. The defending Chinese armies quickly disintegrated. All 
Chennault’s bases in the east were captured.”66 The Ichigo offensive absorbed almost the 
entire Fourteenth Air Force effort in 1944, as the Fourteenth tried unsuccessfully to 
defend itself, and conquered vast areas of Chinese territory occupied by one hundred 
million people. The Chinese military lost five hundred thousand men to Ichigo, and only 
two of fifteen major, American, combat airfield complexes survived the offensive. 67 
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 Distracted by events elsewhere and stung by their failure to seize the city of 
Changsha in late-1941, the Japanese Imperial Army stopped conducting strategic 
offensives in China for two years after 1941. In mid-1941, the Japanese Army began to 
remove its best formations from China and to replace them with inexperienced and less 
heavily equipped units and to send to China fewer supplies and munitions, relying instead 
upon Chinese production to support the Japanese Army in China. The new forces then 
operated on a small scale against the Chinese in order to gain experience and keep the 
Chinese off balance while the newly released troops moved southward into French Indo-
China and Thailand, and later into Southeast Asia and the various islands of the Pacific 
Ocean. After the European Axis powers invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, and after 
Japan decided not to invade the Soviet Union from behind, the Japanese Army also began 
to replace its forces in Korea and Manchuria with new formations and to send the 
veterans to the more active theaters of war.68 
 In 1942 and 1943, the Japanese Imperial Army’s small-scale operations did not 
translate into being completely idle in China. In both years, the Japanese Army advanced 
incrementally, seizing choice bits of terrain and conducting raids to seize or destroy 
Chinese forces, facilities, and equipment. The Japanese Army strengthened its forces by 
giving many new soldiers and airmen valuable battle experience at relatively light cost 
against relatively non-lethal opponents while, for two years, also undoing much of the 
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rebuilding that China’s armed forces attempted and preventing Chinese and American 
forces from too strongly fortifying and upgrading Chinese-held railroads, airbases, river 
networks, and defensive positions. The Japanese Army kept the Kuomintang, Chinese 
Army, and Chinese economy weak and fractious, preventing China from becoming a 
strategic threat to Japan, while simultaneously building itself up and allowing the Empire 
to exploit China’s resources in support of the Japanese war effort in theaters other than 
China. 
 As Major General Chennault’s anti-shipping campaign began in China in July 
1943, the Japanese Imperial Army began to look upon the future of the Japanese Empire 
on mainland Asia with a critical eye. Allied forces advancing across the Central and 
South Pacific did not yet directly threaten the Japanese occupation forces in China or the 
shipping lanes between Japan and the East Indies, but American submarines made 
growing inroads into the Japanese merchant marine’s strength and the Fourteenth Air 
Force posed a potential threat to Japanese shipping lanes between Taiwan and points 
south and southwest of there. In November 1943, too, the Fourteenth began to attack 
Taiwan and the Imperial Headquarters began to feel a degree of urgency to initiate 
countermeasures, lest the new B-29 bombers begin bombing Japan proper from airbases 
in southeastern China. The Japanese Army could take little initiative against American 
submarines or the advance of Allied forces across the Pacific, but Japanese ground forces 
in China could both deal with the Fourteenth Air Force directly and help to insure their 
own survival against the advancing Allied surface and submarine forces. Japanese Army 
raids against the Chinese in 1943 demonstrated the inability of even combined Chinese 
ground forces and American aerial forces to stop determined Japanese ground advances 
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and telegraphed the best method by which the Japanese Empire could stop the 
Fourteenth’s depredations and insure itself against any resurgent Chinese threat.69 
 Imperial Headquarters created the Ichigo plan as a booster for Japanese and a 
depressant for Allied morale after the long string of reverses suffered by Japanese forces 
in the Central and South Pacific areas but, after realizing the danger of American air 
forces based in China, began to diversify Ichigo’s objectives. The American airbases in 
southern China served as primary objectives of the Ichigo plan from the beginning, but 
assumed greater importance as American aerial forces began to attack targets on Taiwan 
and continued to develop the B-29. Imperial Headquarters added the capture and 
rehabilitation of a continental corridor between Wuhan and Indochina as an objective 
after the Allied advance across the Pacific Ocean began to accelerate. The Japanese 
Imperial Army required the use of its massive stockpiles of supplies in North China in 
order to conduct Ichigo and thus added the conquest and rehabilitation of the rail line 
between Wuhan and the Yellow River as an objective; the Allied advance across the 
Pacific coupled with submarine depredations to make this portion of Ichigo even more 
important. Militarily, the Chinese Army posed a potential, if not imminent, threat to 
Japanese control of East and South China; the dozens of divisions of the Chinese Army 
deployed between Wuhan, Canton, and Luichow served as another objective of Ichigo.70 
 Within China, the ill-equipped and ill-led Chinese Army posed a potential, rather 
than an existent, strategic threat to Japanese interests. In late-1943, the bulk of the combat 
forces of the Chinese Army occupied three major deployment areas: along the Yangtze 
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River between occupied Wuhan and the temporary capitol city of Chungking, behind the 
Yellow River in the vicinity of Chengchow where the Chinese blew open the Yellow 
River dykes earlier in the war, and in and south of the city of Changsha between Wuhan 
and Canton. The Ichigo plan called for Japanese forces attacking from both North and 
South and outwards from Wuhan planned to disperse the northern grouping at the Yellow 
River bend and crush the southern grouping before driving its remnants westwards into 
Kweichow and Kwangsi provinces. Ichigo aimed to remove the possible threat posed by 
the Chinese Army from Japanese strategic planning.71 
 The Chinese Army only rarely conducted strategic offensives during World War 
II. The only examples of Chinese Army offensives after 1941 took place in Burma and 
across the Salween River toward Burma, both far from the scene of Ichigo and under 
Lieutenant General Stilwell’s driving influence. Japanese planners, however, needed to 
consider the possibility that the large but inept Chinese Army would finally begin to 
attack, using all of its carefully stored munitions and possibly under American command, 
as soon as the United States or Soviet Union simultaneously conducted their own 
offensives into Japanese occupied China. That scenario served as a nightmare possibility 
that the Japanese Imperial Army considered unacceptable and planned to make 
impossible through Ichigo.72 
 The Fourteenth Air Force’s bases served as the other constant in Ichigo planning. 
Chennault’s anti-shipping campaign served notice to Imperial Headquarters that shipping 
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lanes between Japan and Southeast Asia and the East Indies might become obstructed. 
Fourteenth Air Force attacks against Taiwan, a relatively longtime Japanese possession 
called strict attention to the need to protect Japan from aerial bombardment. The 
execution of Ichigo promised to greatly ameliorate both of these threats by weakening the 
Fourteenth through destruction of facilities, equipment, and morale, by distracting its 
efforts away from strategic targets and onto the Ichigo ground forces, and by driving the 
Fourteenth westwards to bases further from such vital target areas as Shanghai, Taiwan, 
and Japan proper. The southern arm of Ichigo struck first at major combat airfields along 
the Wuhan to Canton rail line and then split its attacks, smaller forces moving eastwards 
to destroy the Fourteenth’s forward bases and the main Ichigo attack proceeding 
westwards toward the Fourteenth’s hubs at Kweilin and Luichow.73 
 As Allied forces moved further across the Pacific Ocean, Imperial Headquarters 
increasingly saw the need for a continental corridor between Manchuria and Indochina. 
The Japanese held the metropolis of Wuhan on the Yangtze River, at the midpoint along 
the Canton-Tientsin rail line and during Ichigo, Japanese forces marched out of that city 
towards both the north and the south while other forces thrust along the rail line from the 
north and south ends. Ichigo placed Chinese forces defending the railroad and United 
States’ airbases along the line and in east China between two fires. After a major effort to 
repair and enlarge the line, Japanese forces could use it and its attendant laterals to help 
to maintain forces throughout eastern China, Indochina, and Burma with little regard to 
the merchant marine. Japanese companies could use the line to exploit the resources of 
eastern and southeastern China and to transport some critical raw materials back toward 
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Japan, thus partially circumventing the blockade that the Allies obviously planned to 
impose. Finally, Japanese forces could use the line to quickly, safely, and economically 
shift forces between each of the current or prospective fronts on mainland Asia.74 
 Given the military situation in China in 1943 and 1944, it is perhaps surprising 
that Imperial Headquarters did not simply order the occupation of China as far 
southwestward as Burma. The Japanese Imperial Army might have been able to conduct 
such a mission, albeit with extreme logistical difficulty; several American military 
authorities of the time stated flatly that the Japanese could conquer any or all of China 
should they so desire. Certainly, if Japan had conquered the Chinese capitol at 
Chungking, the American bomber bases under construction around the major city of 
Chengtu, and the Hump airlift terminus at Kunming, then Chinese government and 
military power would at least have weakened and might have collapsed. Geographic and 
political realities, however, caused Imperial Headquarters a certain reticence toward 
ordering the conquest of the remainder of free and organized China.75 
The Chinese hinterland presented a geographic dead end to any Japanese invader. 
Japanese forces that might advance into the vicinity of Chungking, let alone to even 
further distant Chengtu or Kunming, could not react quickly either to Allied or Soviet 
threats to northern, southeastern, or eastern China or to orders for their withdrawal from 
China. No railroads lead westward from either Wuhan or very far from Canton. For much 
of each year, the characteristics of the Yangtze River to the west of Wuhan make it 
suitable for navigation only by the smallest of river vessels and the Fourteenth Air Force 
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proved to the Japanese in 1943 that even so mighty a river as the Yangtze could be 
virtually blocked by air power and mining. Yunnan province, in fact, is closer to both 
French Indochina and Burma than it is to Wuhan. Naturally, Chinese forces located so far 
from Japanese-occupied territory posed little threat to the Japanese Empire, except 
possibly by attacking into Burma from “behind” the India-Burma frontier, and could not 
easily or quickly reach the front lines in central China.76 
Political considerations also helped to dissuade Imperial Headquarters from 
sending the Japanese Imperial Army along the road to Chungking. The Kuomintang 
behaved, through over seven years of war, as a relatively benign opponent to Japanese 
expansion; waging a civil war in preference to fighting Japanese and expending minimal 
resources against Japanese forces while subverting internal opponents and waiting for 
outside allies to conquer Japan on other battlefields. If Japanese military forces toppled 
the Kuomintang directly, then something might arise to take the Kuomintang’s place as 
the governing body of free China. In Japan’s worst case, a communist regime might 
assume power over both the remains of free China and the nominally Japanese-occupied 
portions of China over which communist guerrillas and councils already held sway. 
Perhaps less disastrous for Japan, though only by degrees, a revitalized nationalist 
government might arise after Generalissimo Chiang and the previous elite fell either from 
power or into Japanese captivity; such a government would most likely have had strong 
American backing and been more open than Chiang had been to prosecute aggressive war 
against the Japanese. These possible results presented Imperial Headquarters with the 
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choice of whether to undertake a truly massive offensive in order to gain possibly 
unfavorable results or to undertake a lesser effort in order to gain almost certainly 
favorable results. Imperial Headquarters made the obvious choice; a large and successful 
Japanese offensive in southern and eastern China to remove much of the Kuomintang’s 
remaining political support, by demonstrating again the impotence of the Kuomintang, 
and military capability.77 
An odd self-interest governed both Japanese and the Kuomintang actions in 1943 
and 1944. Imperial General Headquarters did not want the Kuomintang to collapse 
because the Kuomintang both did not fully control all of free China and did not want to 
expend its strength fighting the Japanese rather than the Communists. The Kuomintang, 
meanwhile, did not trust many of the Chinese officials in southeastern China and would 
not support the armed forces under their control against Japanese forces. In 1943, 
Marshal Li Chi-shen formed a coalition of southern Chinese political and military leaders 
who, possibly with communist support, either planned to contest the dominance of 
Chiang’s faction of the Kuomintang over China or planned to maintain facile 
Kuomintang governance over their territories if a Japanese offensive should sever them 
from the actual Kuomintang control. Generalissimo Chiang saw the coalition forming and 
tried to destroy it through political machination but only prompted a shakeup of the 
Kuomintang that left the southern coalition stronger than before. Unable or unwilling to 
destroy the coalition, Chiang denied the dissident faction supplies and successfully 
lobbied the United States government to withhold both aid and recognition from them as 
well. Despite this prohibition, however, Lieutenant General Albert Wedemeyer, the 
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American commander of the China Theater after Chiang’s machinations finally 
succeeded in having President Roosevelt recall General Stilwell, records in Wedemeyer 
Reports that Major General Chennault disregarded orders not to aid the dissident Chinese 
in Hunan Province, the very forces that protected so many of Chennault’s airbases, and 
Chennault’s personal correspondence lends credence to the claim, despite Chennault’s 
strong ties to Chiang’s regime. In any event, Chinese politics weakened the joint 
American-Chinese war effort and Japanese diplomatic seeds, reportedly sown in 
meetings with both Chiang’s representatives and with Li’s clique, fell upon the fertile 
mud of Chinese politics and apparently bore a useful fruit.78 
Chinese and American forces attempted, often halfheartedly and rarely with 
notable success, to stem the Japanese tide. Forces loyal to Generalissimo Chiang resisted 
and delayed the Japanese advance that connected Japanese positions north of the Yellow 
River to Wuhan but made no determined effort to aid Chinese forces south of Wuhan. 
Chinese forces under Marshal Li and General Hsueh Yueh in Hunan and Kwangsi 
Provinces received no support from Chiang and only a few supplies from the United 
States; China’s southeastern armies quickly routed in the face of the Japanese advance. 
Hsueh’s forces in Hunan Province, the Chinese Ninth War Zone, disintegrated rapidly 
enough to cause American forces as far away as Chengtu to make hurried evacuation 
plans. Officials of the perpetually ill-equipped and unsupplied Chinese Army even 
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hurriedly abandoned a supply dump containing an estimated one hundred thousand tons 
of military supplies without taking time to destroy or distribute the material.79 
Japanese Imperial Army forces achieved their Ichigo objectives in a vast 
campaign, beginning preliminary operations in late-1943 and not stopping Ichigo’s last 
lunges until mid-1945. Japanese forces mauled the Chinese Army and assumed 
stewardship over economic resources from a vast portion of China while simultaneously 
denying the potential of those resources to the Allies. Japanese forces did not overthrow 
the Kuomintang, in fact destroying a potential rival to the Kuomintang whose power 
bases lay in the path of Ichigo, but materially weakened the Chinese government through 
loss of territory, supplies, and military forces and by once again publicly demonstrating 
the Kuomintang’s incompetence to both the Chinese people and the entire world. Ichigo 
secured for the Japanese Empire a continuous railroad connection between Manchuria 
and Indo-China, with all the benefits to be gained from that line, while denying to China 
and the Allies the resources of a vast population and geographic area. Japanese advances 
captured dozens of American airbases in eastern, southern, and central China and pushed 
the Fourteenth Air Force westwards to bases hundreds of miles deeper inside China and 
further from their intended targets. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PLANNING FOR MATTERHORN: ALLIED STRATEGY AGAINST JAPAN 
 
 Even before the United States entered World War II as a formal combatant, 
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister of Great Britain Winston Churchill agreed upon 
a strategy that concentrated American and British power upon the defeat of the European 
Axis powers before beginning to concentrate in the Pacific area against the Japanese 
Empire. With the Chinese Air Force impotent in the face of, and the impotent Chinese 
Navy destroyed by, Japanese air power, and after France surrendered to Germany in 1940 
and subsequently admitted Japanese forces to Indochina, the western shore along the 
Japanese sea route to the East Indies became secure. When Japanese forces devastated the 
battleship squadrons of the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 
1941, they also eliminated any hope that the United States Navy could stride across the 
Pacific Ocean, save the Philippine Islands, and cut Japan off from the natural resources of 
Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies in one swift campaign. In the Philippines and 
Malays, Japanese attacks and landings in December 1941 progressed well enough to 
make the Japanese conquest, if aggressively sought, simply a matter of time. Allied, a 
term that in the Pacific Theater after mid-1942 came increasingly to mean American, 
strategy in the war against the Japanese Empire stemmed from events that occurred not 
later than December 1941.80 
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 American naval planners spent much of the two decades of peace between World 
War I and World War II drawing the Rainbow plans, one of which formed the basic 
outline of the strategy that the armed forces of the United States followed against the 
Japanese Empire in World War II. The United States Pacific Fleet planned to strike 
westward from Hawaii toward the Philippine Islands and hoped to find the American-
occupied Philippines still in friendly hands and able to support the fleet once it arrived. 
The United States Navy planned to seize island stepping stones in the Caroline and 
Marshall Islands, mandated to Japan from Germany by the League of Nations after World 
War I, in order to aid the advance and guard the lines of communication, and considered 
invading some of the islands south of Japan in order to tighten a blockade of Japan and to 
serve as bases for air attacks against targets in and around the Japanese home islands. The 
Navy, together with the Army Air Corps then planned to blockade and bombard Japan 
into submission by destroying the Japanese economy’s ability to support the war, 
hopefully without conducting an invasion of Japan proper.81 
 Immediately after Japanese forces began attacking forces and facilities belonging 
to Australia, the United States, the Netherlands, and the British Empire, Allied 
submarines began the first direct attacks upon the economy of the Japanese Empire. 
Throughout the war, many Allied submarine operations concentrated upon such tactical 
tasks as supporting guerrilla organizations, rescuing downed airmen, moving vital 
supplies, and scouting for and guarding against Japanese military forces, but Allied 
submarines contributed to victory over the Japanese Empire primarily by attacking 
Japanese merchant vessels. Early in the war, with Japanese forces advancing and Allied 
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forces in dire need of support, Allied submarines attacked the Japanese economy by 
concentrating upon tasks such as attacking convoys bound to and from front line islands 
and battles. After mid-1942, after the Japanese offensive stalled and Allied forces began 
to conduct offensives of their own, Allied submarines helped to weaken both the 
Japanese military and economy by creeping inside the Japanese defense perimeter and 
attacking convoys both of supplies and troops and of raw materials. Eventually, Allied 
submarines even penetrated into the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan and ravaged the 
previously untouchable commerce that flowed between Japan and Korea, North China, 
and Manchuria. Naturally, Japanese shipping sought protection from the depredations of 
Allied submarines; lurking in ports at night and using routes through the shallowest 
possible waters helped merchant ships to protect themselves against submarines but made 
them rather less efficient and more vulnerable to aerial attack. Both directly and 
indirectly, submarines contributed immensely to the destruction of the Japanese 
economy.82 
 Allied ground forces did not find the Japanese economy to be as accessible a 
target as did Allied submarines. Allied ground forces contributed to attacking the 
Japanese economy almost exclusively at third hand, by attracting and destroying the 
fruits of the Japanese economy and, more importantly, by providing ever advancing bases 
for Allied air and naval forces. Chinese and other Allied ground forces, especially 
including irregular forces behind Japanese lines, also contributed to weakening the 
Japanese economy, or at least to preventing it from expanding as swiftly as it might have, 
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by destroying accessible materials and installations of economic value either before 
Japanese forces seized the installations or by sabotaging them after the battle lines rolled 
past. 
 Allied ground based, tactical air forces found the Japanese economy a difficult 
target to attack both consistently and directly. Tactical air units contributed most 
effectively to the war against the Japanese economy by placing attacks against Japanese 
ships at the top of their list of priorities, except in the direst tactical emergencies. 
Japanese ground forces could not easily retreat from island battlefields, but Japanese 
ships could more easily do so. Allied commanders thus ordered tactical air units to 
concentrate upon destroying the shipping that connected Japanese bases to the Japanese 
economy before actually attacking the bases themselves. These attacks, while 
occasionally effective within their limits, only damaged those portions of the Japanese 
economy that came within reach; tactical air forces operating against economic targets of 
opportunity could do little to crush the most vital portions of the Japanese economy 
simply because most of, and the most vital portions of, the Japanese economy lay deep 
inside Japanese controlled territory.83 
 Allied, naval, surface forces found the Japanese economy to be an occasionally 
accessible target and struck it accordingly. Naval aircraft attacked Japanese merchant 
vessels and economic facilities whenever encountering such, especially when naval 
forces ventured inside the Japanese strategic perimeter to strike at ships and facilities in 
previously secure areas. On rare occasions, surface ships contributed directly to the 
Allied attack against the Japanese economy, first while fighting defensive battles such as 
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Balikpapan in the East Indies and later while conducting anti-shipping sweeps and 
bombarding Japanese economic facilities. Allied naval air and naval surface forces 
contributed indirectly to destroying the Japanese economy by destroying Japanese 
material, especially including ships suitable for anti-submarine warfare, and by helping 
ground forces to seize bases closer to the heart of the Japanese economy.84 
 Allied strategic bombers frequently and directly attacked the Japanese economy. 
The Fourteenth Air Force began a formal anti-shipping campaign in July 1943, largely 
using B-24 heavy bombers, and heavy bombers in other air forces facing Japan moved 
Japanese shipping to the top of their target lists even earlier. Heavy bomber units 
bombarded islands and anchorages in the Central Pacific, more discrete ports, mines, and 
factories in the East Indies, and ports, rail yards, and warehouses on mainland Asia and 
Taiwan. Heavy bombers also flew reconnaissance missions looking for ships that they 
themselves and other air and naval forces then attacked. Heavy bombers made especially 
effective attacks against the Japanese economy by laying mines in ports, rivers, and 
straits, not only sinking or damaging ships but forcing others to delay or redirect their 
voyages and thus to cascade inefficiencies throughout their client industries. Outdated 
and obsolescent B-24 and B-17 heavy bombers accomplished that much during the years 
when the Japanese defense perimeter extended thousands of miles from Japan proper, 
when the new B-29s came into active service, planners should have expected even 
more.85 
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 In deciding how to employ the B-29s when they came into service, planners 
considered a wide range of targets and bases. B-17s, B-24s, and the Royal Air Force’s 
Bomber Command provided a substantial and growing strategic bombing capability that 
struck into the heart of Germany on an almost daily basis and that seemed adequate to the 
task of bombing Germany. Japan, on the other hand, lay beyond the reach of these types 
of aircraft but potentially not of the Very Long Range project’s B-29s. Commanders in 
the Pacific cried out for the B-29s while those in Europe remained far less vocal. 
Consequently, President Roosevelt, General Arnold, and other planners first decided to 
send the B-29s to fight against the Japanese Empire.86 
Well before B-29s neared active service, the Committee of Operations Analysts, a 
staff group that provided information and analysis to Allied planners, took the next step 
in deciding what the B-29s would attack when finally they did see combat. The 
Committee selected six types of targets, the destruction of which would essentially end 
Japanese war production: shipping, coke ovens for the steel industry, general urban 
industry, anti-friction bearings, the electronics industry, and aircraft manufacturing. The 
Committee further pointed out that the Japanese oil industry provided the fuel for the 
Japanese war machine and merchant marine and thus also served as a vitally important 
target. The Allied militaries directed all of their truly strategic attacks, whether by land, 
air, submarine, or surface ship, against one of these seven target areas.87 
Most Allied forces could not operate directly against the Japanese oil industry 
because most of Japan’s wells and refineries lay in either Japan, Manchuria, or the East 
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Indies, beyond the reach of Allied weapons. B-24 bombers based in Australia 
occasionally bombed Japanese-held oil refineries at Surabaya and Balikpapan, but only 
carried a miniscule three thousand pounds of bombs to such distant targets, making 
decisive success impossible to achieve. Until B-29 bombers entered service the Allies 
could only attack the Japanese oil industry tactically, while the oil sailed in merchant 
vessels, and with pinprick strategic strikes against the few installations within reach of 
Allied weapons. B-29 bombers could operate against the Japanese Empire’s natural oil 
supply in the East Indies more easily, from bases in Ceylon with slightly more bombs 
than B-24s could from Australia or from Australia with massive loads of between five 
and ten tons of bombs, and against the Japanese Empire’s small but growing oil shale and 
synthetic oil industries in Manchuria, from bases in China. One factor militated against 
attacking the Japanese Empire’s oil supply; when B-29 bombers finally entered combat, 
Allied submarine and aerial interdiction might already be severing the chain of ships that 
connected the Japanese oil industry to the Japanese home islands. In any case, the Allies 
expected results from operations at such great distances to be gradual and long in coming; 
the Japanese oil industry did not seem likely to be a decisive target until late in the war, if 
ever.88 
The Allies could not decisively, or even heavily, attack the Japanese Empire’s 
aircraft, anti-friction bearing, electronic, and urban industries early in World War II. The 
critical facilities within these industries lay predominantly in Japan proper, beyond the 
reach of the Allies before the United States Marine Corps and Army captured the 
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Mariana Islands. B-29 bombers based in China might attack the aircraft, electronic, and 
bearing facilities in Manchuria, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan. B-24 bombers flying from 
free Chinese territory could attack targets on Taiwan and many aircraft could attack the 
urban industries in such cities as Bangkok, Hanoi, and Shanghai from bases in China, 
Burma, and India. The very diversity and abundance of these targets limited the Allies, 
who could destroy numerous textile mills or cement plants, for instance, without 
significantly impairing the Japanese ability to wage war. Even if the Allies inflicted vast 
destruction upon every urban area within reach, the bombs would slaughter 
predominantly friendly civilians while reducing the Japanese supply of numerous items 
of little, individual importance. After the Allies captured the Mariana Islands, B-29 
bombers could attack factories and cities all across Honshu and Kyushu, but until then 
the centers of gravity of the Japanese aircraft, electronics, anti-friction bearing, and urban 
industries lay beyond Allied reach.89 
For two reasons, the Japanese steel industry presented a uniquely vulnerable 
target when compared to Japan’s other industries. Coke ovens served as the best tactical 
points at which to attack the Japanese steel industry because they consisted of precise 
masonry and required up to a year to rebuild after being damaged by nearby explosions. 
Other areas of steel mills, by contrast, resist the effects of bombing because steel mills 
are built to work with heavy weights of high temperature materials. Further, limited 
Japanese coke capacity and supply formed one of the two main constraints upon Japanese 
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steel production; any change in the amount of coke produced by the Japanese steel 
industry would translate immediately into a corresponding change in the amount of steel 
produced by that industry. More than half of Japanese coke capacity—the backbone of 
the Japanese steel industry—lay within range of B-29 bombers based in Central China. 
B-29 bombers could thus attack over half of the most vulnerable points in the Japanese 
steel industry from territory that anti-Japanese Chinese forces controlled in December 
1941.90 
 The Allies understood that the steel industry served a vital role in a country at war 
and served as an incredibly valuable strategic target for that reason. For the Japanese 
Empire, any reduction in already inadequate steel production meant corresponding and 
immediate reductions in the production of many war materials. Virtually all types of 
industrial and railroad construction also required steel and any industrial expansion or 
repair thus depended upon steel production. As a partial counterbalance to the 
vulnerability of their steel industry, Japanese leaders chose which projects received how 
much steel, thus mitigating their own troubles to a certain degree by reducing steel 
allocations to lower priority projects and making an attack against Japan’s steel industry 
an effort that would only show decisive results in the long-term. Nonetheless, if B-29s 
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destroyed the over half of Japanese coke capacity accessible from bases located in China, 
Japanese production and construction would suffer across a wide range of industries.91 
Another factor limited the effect of operations against the Japanese steel industry: 
the Japanese possessed an excess of coke manufacturing capacity in the home islands. 
The Japanese steel industry operated its mainland coke ovens and pig iron and steel 
plants at full capacity, taking advantage of locally, relatively abundant high-grade coal 
and iron ore. The Japanese merchant marine then shipped excess coke, pig iron, and steel 
to the home islands in place of raw coal and ore, thus saving a tremendous amount of 
merchant shipping for other duties. The Japanese built much of the steel industry in the 
home islands before the Empire acquired Manchuria and, as Manchurian facilities came 
on-line and dramatically increased their capacities, operated steel facilities within Japan 
at a reduced tempo that nonetheless still produced two-thirds of Japanese pig iron and 
almost ninety percent of Japanese steel. The Japanese steel industry thus possessed 
significant unused capacity in the home islands and could restore it to production by 
diverting shipping from other duties to convey raw coal and ore from the mainland to the 
home islands. Even without reductions in mainland production however, the Japanese 
merchant marine lacked the ships necessary to both fulfill its other obligations and to 
carry the amount of coal and ore required for the Japanese steel industry to make full use 
of the steel, pig iron, and coke oven assets in the home islands. The Japanese steel 
industry consumed over half of all Japanese import tonnage and required four times that 
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amount in order to fully utilize the ovens and furnaces in the home islands.  The Japanese 
Empire simply lacked the merchant ships necessary to achieve full steel production.92 
 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey states that “no country could have 
been further from self-sufficiency, with respect to raw materials, than Japan. It was 
desperately vulnerable to attack on its shipping.”93 Raw materials and finished 
commodities could not move between Japan’s colonies, the home islands, and distant 
battlefields without using merchant shipping. The bulk of industry within Japan proper 
could not function without vast imports of raw and semi-processed materials. The 
Japanese Empire could not move fuel to air and naval schools in the home islands, to 
ground and air forces in Northeast Asia, or to fighting squadrons in the Central and 
Southwest Pacific without merchant ships. The Japanese economy depended upon 
massive quantities of imported resources and could not sustain industrialized economic 
activity without using equally massive shipping resources. Because of the singular 
importance of merchant shipping to every other military and economic activity within the 
Empire, Japanese shipping served as a more important target of Allied attack than any 
single industry ever could.94 
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 For the Allies, the Japanese merchant marine presented a difficult target to attack 
decisively. The Japanese Empire used its merchant ships as its planners saw fit, suffering 
a high proportion of any economic damage in areas of minimal value. Japanese 
shipyards, furthermore, concentrated within Japan proper and lay as far from American 
attackers as any other industrial facilities in the home islands.  Until the Allies could 
bombard the Japanese home islands, the Allies attacked the Japanese merchant marine 
primarily by attacking single ships and by rendering certain sea-lanes and ports 
dangerous or unusable. Because so many types of Allied assets could attack Japanese 
merchant ships but could not attack so many other branches of the Japanese economy, the 
Allies began a strategic offensive against the Japanese merchant marine. The Allied 
submarine fleet began to seek out the Japanese merchant marine in the depths of the 
Japanese Empire while land-based air units made the destruction of any Japanese 
merchant or naval vessel within reach their highest priority mission. The United States 
Navy increasingly attacked Japanese island ports across the Pacific while heavy bombers 
attacked ports and convoys and seeded mines in ports and waterways deep inside 
Japanese-held territory. 95 
 Knowing that the B-29s ought to attack shipping, coke ovens, urban industry, 
aircraft manufacturing, anti-friction bearing manufacturing, or the electronic or oil 
industry in order to support the Allied strategy of attacking the Japanese economy, 
planners then reviewed which of those targets B-29s could plausibly attack and from 
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where. Given that the majority of the facilities and equipment belonging to industries on 
that list lay on the Japanese home islands of Honshu, Kyushu, and Shikoku, most top-
level planners agreed that the Mariana Islands served as the most useful, eventual bases 
for the B-29s. Being islands with notable lagoons, merchant ships could provide logistical 
support almost directly from the United States to airbases on Saipan and Guam, and 
Japanese ground and aerial forces would pose only marginal threats after Allied forces 
secured the islands. From the Mariana Islands, Allied aircraft could finally, decisively 
attack the Japanese economy and begin to directly implement the Allied strategic plan to 
exhaust the Japanese ability to wage war.96 
 Planners considered Mariana Islands bases to be less than ideal for one primary 
reason: few believed that Allied forces could seize the islands and prepare the airfields 
before late 1944 or early 1945. Planners hoped that the first wing of B-29 bombers would 
enter combat in mid 1944 and could not justify holding them out of combat while other 
forces seized and completed bases for the B-29s. The issue posed a problem for planners 
who needed to decide where best to employ the B-29s between when the B-29s began 
their combat service and when they could transfer to the Mariana Islands. The topic took 
on considerable urgency as various generals and admirals called for the almost mythically 
capable bombers to operate under their command for some special and urgent purpose, 
but simultaneously the topic lost considerable importance as Allied forces accelerated 
their drives across the Central and Southwest Pacific Theaters. Eventually, Allied forces 




invaded the Mariana Islands on the same day that the still not completely trained 
Twentieth Bomber Command carried out the first B-29 bombing mission.97 
 When exactly the new units of B-29s would become combat ready served as a 
complicating factor for those who made the decisions about where and how to employ the 
new bombers. The first production B-29 rolled out the factory doors in July 1943 and 
general plans called for the planes to enter combat in the middle of 1944. Before that 
could happen, air and ground crews needed to learn how to do their jobs and both the 
fighting squadrons and their command and support organizations needed to deploy from 
their continental United States training bases to their combat bases. Meanwhile, engineers 
in the intended theater of operation worked to prepare not only all of those combat bases 
but also the logistical network connecting the bases to the continental United States. 
All new military units transition through a phase during which the personnel learn 
to work together as a team and any unit that receives significantly updated or new type 
equipment must overcome a learning curve: the newly formed Twentieth Air Force, 
Twentieth Bomber Command, and Fifty-eighth Bombardment Wing (Very Heavy) 
encountered both problems simultaneously. The Twentieth’s second wing, the Seventy-
third Bombardment Wing (Very Heavy) followed shortly behind the Fifty-eighth in 
training and benefited somewhat from the experience gained by the pioneers. To ease the 
difficulties, Lieutenant General Arnold saw to it that the Pentagon assigned the Twentieth 
a cadre of veteran bomber men who previously completed tours in combat zones and rest 
periods at home. Even given the veteran cadre, or perhaps because of it, the Twentieth’s 
leaders failed to allocate sufficient time to transform the assembled Twentieth Bomber 
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Command into an efficient combat unit. As the Twentieth formed and began to receive its 
equipment in mid 1943, the Twentieth fell steadily further behind in its schedule of 
training so that the unit’s operational readiness date grew ever more grossly unrealistic.98 
The Twentieth Bomber Command’s first commander, Brigadier General Kenneth 
Wolfe, planned to spend eight months training his command to operate its new steeds as a 
unit before deploying overseas. During those eight months the Fifty-eighth Bombardment 
Wing’s four groups of sixteen total squadrons tried to learn to operate, alone and in 
groups and during all conditions, a brand new type of aircraft that came equipped with a 
number of radical new features. That the Twentieth could not achieve its training 
objectives became obvious long before the Twentieth's departure date came near and only 
shortly after construction began on the airbases in India and China. The Twentieth issued 
its tactical manual in February 1944, after nearly completing training, and sans still 
incomplete sections on photography, radar use, and navigation and emergency 
procedures. In March 1944, with equipment already in transit toward Asia, the Twentieth 
Bomber Command staff began to ask Eighth Air Force staff officers in Europe for their 
recommendations about which formations and techniques to use when bombing a variety 
of targets under various conditions of visibility. When the Twentieth began operating, the 
inability of its crews to assemble into formation, navigate over long distances, and 
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manage their fuel supply proved the accuracy of reports that training in those skills 
remained inadequate.99 
 Once the Twentieth Bomber Command began assembling and training, planners 
exerted little influence over that process and, taking the mid-1944 operational date as 
gospel, turned their attention to determining useful ways to employ the Twentieth before 
the Mariana Island bases became available. The Allied commander of the Southwest 
Pacific Theater, General Douglas MacArthur, and the Fifth Air Force commander, Major 
General George Kenney, asked repeatedly that the B-29s occupy bases in Australia and 
New Guinea and operate against Japanese shipping and oil resources. Admiral Ernest 
King, the Chief of Naval Operations of the United States Navy, and Admiral Chester 
Nimitz, commander of the Allied Central Pacific Theater, halfheartedly asked that the B-
29s work in the Central Pacific as reconnaissance and bombing aircraft; the Navy 
approach offered the Twentieth the opportunity to help to directly win its own ultimate 
bases but contributed little to the strategic attack against the Japanese economy and never 
entered serious consideration. General Arnold sought to keep the Twentieth out from 
under the command of theater commanders and to find a place from which it could attack 
the Japanese home islands. President Roosevelt, Major General Chennault, and 
Generalissimo Chiang all embraced the idea of basing the Twentieth in China and using 
the organization to attack the Japanese home islands, to support Chinese prestige and 
morale, and to funnel more supplies and money into China. Prime Minister Churchill and 
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other British leaders sought to have the Twentieth base in India, to report to if not accept 
many orders from British officials in India, and to attack both the Japanese lines of 
communication in Southeast Asia and the Japanese oil industry in the Netherlands East 
Indies.100 
 Diplomatic intrigue and inter-service rivalry played a significant role in 
determining the employment of the B-29 force before they deployed to the Mariana 
Islands. Other Army Air Force leaders reacted negatively toward Army Air Force Major 
General Kenney’s attempts to gain use of B-29s because few in the Army Air Force 
desired to place their newest baby under the control of the powerful General MacArthur, 
who commanded Kenney and the whole Southwest Pacific Theater. Kenney’s chances 
steadily declined along with relations between the United States and Australia, where 
Kenney wanted to base the bombers; free of any threat of invasion, the Australians 
reasserted themselves beginning in 1943 and would have wanted a share in controlling 
any B-29s based in their country. British leaders experienced much the same rebuff 
whenever anyone made suggestions about basing the first B-29s in India; commanders in 
India could not avoid coordinating with Lord Admiral Louis Mountbatten, commander of 
the Allied Burma-India Theater, who even the British Commander in Chief, Far Eastern 
Fleet, Admiral Sir James Somerville noted “wanted a finger in every pie,” because of 
diplomatic considerations, and no prominent American advocated placing B-29s under 
British command. No responsible American seriously considered putting Generalissimo 
Chiang, the titular commander of the Allied China Theater in actual command of 
American strategic bombers either, and Chiang lacked the leverage to gain any control 
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that the United States did not voluntarily give him. After weighing these situations, Army 
Air Force leaders supported the idea of basing the first B-29s in China, where they might 
bomb as an independent, strategic force.101 
Diplomatic and political concerns thus became predominant reasons for sending 
the first operational B-29 squadrons to China rather than to another area of the Pacific 
Theater. From China, B-29s could make the Army Air Force the first to mount sustained 
attacks against the Japanese home islands and possibly make a decisive contribution to 
winning the war, thus cementing the Air Force claim to deserving status as a branch 
within the armed forces of the United States. More personally, General Arnold missed his 
chances to command aerial combat units in either world war and found China to be a 
theater where he could justify commanding a separate air force directly from his office in 
the Pentagon in spite of simultaneously disobeying Army Air Force doctrine, published 
under his own command, that called for theater commanders to command strategic air 
forces based in their theaters. President Roosevelt considered China to be the best place 
to send the B-29s not only because of their ability to bomb Japan from China but also 
because he desired to use the B-29s to support Generalissimo Chiang’s internal and 
international position and status, though exactly how moving the force to China would 
aid Chiang’s struggle to gain control of his country never became clear. Chiang’s false 
intimations of surrendering to Japan caused Roosevelt genuine fear, and though that fear 
faded as the Fourteenth Air Force grew and the Japanese began no strategic offensives 
against China 1943, Roosevelt felt other reasons to aid Chiang. Roosevelt supported 
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Chiang personally, still believed that China could serve a prominent role in both war and 
peace, and allowed the decision to reflect his personal distaste for Lieutenant General 
Stilwell’s tactless behavior. Only in China could the B-29s serve the dual purpose of 
appearing to aid China and promoting Air Force independence as a new military service 
without encountering powerful Army, Navy, or foreign leaders who would usurp the 
Army Air Force’s authority over the new force.102 
 Target selection served as the other major factor that helped to determine where 
the Twentieth Bomber Command landed after it left the United States. During World War 
II, essentially every United States Army and Army Air Force leader of consequence 
believed that strategic bombers ought to attack strategic targets, as opposed to targets of 
only tactical significance, though some leaders considered targets to be tactical or 
strategic that others believed to be the reverse. From bases in India, B-29s could attack 
Japanese oil resources in the Netherlands East Indies, the significant fraction of Japanese 
merchant shipping that passed near French Indochina and the Malay Peninsula, and 
Japanese lines of communication through Southeast Asia, but would come under the 
titular command of a Briton. From Australia and New Guinea, B-29s could attack the 
sources of Japanese oil and the important and numerous merchant vessels that carried the 
resources of the Netherlands East Indies to the remainder of the empire, but the new force 
might fall under the influence of Australian or British leaders there and would certainly 
come under the command of the famous General MacArthur. From China, B-29s could 
attack the most important parts of the Japanese steel industry and, to a lesser extent, every 
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other arm of the Japanese economy with minimal risk of interference by foreign or non-
Army Air Force leaders. Steel seemed like an acceptable target and carried little of the 
political baggage that would accompany any operation against shipping or oil targets.103 
 Having determined that the Twentieth Air Force might base in China, India, or the 
Southwest Pacific, though the China option seems to have been almost a given due to 
other considerations, planners sought to determine whether, where, and how suitable 
bases might be constructed and defended in those areas. In October 1943, Lieutenant 
General Kenney wrote to General Arnold that he commanded five bases in northern 
Australia large enough to accommodate twenty-five B-29s each and was overseeing the 
construction of six more such fields in New Guinea besides having five months to 
construct any further fields that might be necessary. Ground and aerial defense of 
northern Australia posed no difficulty to the Allies after 1942 and though Japanese forces 
might attack bases in New Guinea by air, no significant Japanese ground threat to eastern 
and southern New Guinea remained plausible by late 1943. The defensive situation for B-
29 bases in India appeared similar to that in New Guinea, with the failed 1944 Japanese 
Imphal offensive as evidence of a slightly increased ground threat, but India held no 
bases suitable for B-29s. In India and Ceylon, if the B-29s staged through that island to 
attack the Netherlands East Indies, the overstretched British military and sullen and 
uncooperative Indian civilians might construct temporary bases but only American 
engineers and equipment could have forged the Twentieth a rainy season-proof home. 
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Beyond these problems, India simply lay further from and along more dangerous 
shipping lanes from the United States than did Australia and New Guinea. Within the 
respective theaters, prospective bases in India also lay dramatically further from the 
nearest ports than did those in the Southwest Pacific. The difficulties presented by basing 
in India nonetheless paled in comparison to those to be encountered if the Twentieth went 
to China.104 
 China served as by far the least suitable proposed country in which to build bases 
for the Twentieth Air Force. Planners suggested three possible base areas within China: 
along the rail line south of Changsha, near Kweilin and Luichow in southeastern China, 
and around Chengtu in western Szechwan Province. Generalissimo Chiang and Major 
General Chennault promised and apparently believed that the Chinese Army would and 
could defend the Twentieth’s bases, but Changsha lay too close to Japanese forces for 
comfort and did not receive serious consideration. Southeastern China also lay well 
within Japanese reach, being connected by navigable rivers to the Japanese strongholds 
of Canton and Wuhan and closer to those places than to Chinese forces that held the 
Yangtze River gorges for the Kuomintang. The Fourteenth Air Force ensured that some 
of its bases in southeastern China could accommodate B-29s for special missions, but the 
Twentieth could not reasonably move to an area so exposed to attack. Chengtu, unlike the 
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other China locations, did not lay within easy or likely reach of Japanese ground forces or 
even of short-range Japanese aircraft. The Chengtu area did hold an enormous 
population, being an agricultural basin amidst encircling mountain ranges, and offered 
poor road and river access and essentially no construction equipment availability. For the 
Twentieth Air Force, the Chengtu area offered only a mass of unskilled labor that the 
Chinese government put to work to build bases there for the Twentieth Bomber 
Command.105 
 For planners, providing logistical support to the Twentieth Bomber Command 
played an inordinately small role in determining where to deploy the force. Naturally, 
Australia served as the most suitable choice of places from which to operate the 
Twentieth; Darwin lay close to prospective B-29 airbases and boasted adequate port 
facilities to handle a heavy volume of traffic. New Guinea offered no great port facilities, 
but prospective bases at least lay near beaches and small ports; New Guinean bases 
would also require relatively few supplies because the B-29s would undoubtedly only 
stage through them from nearby permanent bases in Australia. Prospective bases around 
Kharagpur, India relied on longer and more difficult sea lines than did Australia and also 
relied upon a heavily burdened Indian logistical system that already supported the land 
and air efforts in Burma and China. For the Services of Supply, of course, Chinese bases 
provided the least attractive place in which to support the Twentieth. Chinese bases began 
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with all the disadvantages of Indian bases and then added both the Himalayan Mountains 
and hundreds of miles of further distance beyond them as additional obstacles.106 
 Planners chose for the Twentieth Bomber Command to base on mainland Asia 
and to attack the Japanese steel industry, in preference to the other base and target 
combinations, by weighing relative values and essentially ignoring obvious difficulties. 
American planners discarded the idea of attacking Japanese lines of communication 
through Southeast Asia because they lacked substantial strategic value. Planners decided 
not to heavily attack Japan’s oil industry because submarines and advancing Allied 
ground bases already hindered, and would soon almost strangle, the shipping lanes 
between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies. Planners dismissed shipping as a primary 
target because some planners believed that heavy bombers lacked the precision to attack 
ships, others objected to duplicating the efforts of the other ships and planes that already 
attacked the Japanese merchant marine at every opportunity, and no important person in 
the Army Air Force desired to place B-29s under the influence of General MacArthur and 
the Australians or of Lord Admiral Mountbatten and the British. President Roosevelt 
desired to help Generalissimo Chiang and the Army Air Force desired to use its largest 
bomber against traditionally strategic targets without interference. No leader accepted 
that the Himalayas might prove an insurmountable barrier to adequate logistical 
support.107 
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 Arguments against attacking Japanese communications through Southeast Asia 
made perfect sense and found substantial agreement among American planners. The 
target supported only the Burma front, where Allied forces failed to seriously 
contemplate any large offensives and stood upon a solid defensive. Economic assets 
flowed through and near Southeast Asia, but those from the Netherlands East Indies 
could also flow around the area, closer to the Philippine Islands, with little difficulty. If 
the Twentieth Bomber Command were to drop a bomb on a Burmese bridge or a 
Bangkok railroad yard then it would also fail to drop that bomb on a target of notable 
value to the Japanese economy.  For the Twentieth, the Southeast Asia lines of 
communication did present an opportunity to attack Japanese merchant shipping, but the 
ships would be only one target among many and would suffer little as compared to if the 
Twentieth attacked shipping exclusively.108 
 Arguments against directing the Twentieth Bomber Command to attack the 
Japanese oil industry also followed an arguably logical vein. The B-29s could bomb 
synthetic and shale oil facilities in Manchuria from bases in China, but those facilities 
provided only a small proportion of Japanese fuel, drained many other resources from the 
Japanese war effort, and would fall intact into friendly Chinese hands if not destroyed 
during the war. Regarding oil from Southeast Asia, Allied submarines targeted Japanese 
oil tankers with increasing effectiveness as the war went on and Allied forces aimed to 
occupy the Philippine Islands and place an unbreakable blockade across the strait 
between Luzon and China, thus cutting Japan off from the oil, and all of the other 
resources, of the Netherlands East Indies, without having to destroy those resources.  One 
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factor, however, encouraged the use of B-29s against Palembang and Balikpapan and the 
other centers of the oil industry in the Netherlands East Indies: from bases as distant as 
Broome and Darwin, Australia, a B-29 could carry between ten and twenty thousand 
pounds of bombs to any important oil facility in the Netherlands East Indies. No oil 
industry could long operate while sustaining attacks of that magnitude and the Twentieth 
could thus cut off, more quickly and thoroughly than submarines or blockade, the flow of 
oil not only northward toward Japan proper but also to anywhere else in the empire and to 
Japanese naval vessels that trained and operated from Southeast Asia primarily because 
there their fuel supply proved relatively secure.109 
 One argument against using the Twentieth Bomber Command against Japanese 
merchant shipping stated that heavy bombers made poor anti-shipping platforms, but 
heavy bombers, and especially B-29s, made excellent anti-shipping platforms if 
employed correctly. As long-endurance, night capable, radar equipped, self-protecting 
reconnaissance platforms, B-29s would have been unmatched in their ability to search for 
enemy ships at great distances from friendly airbases. B-29s could have bombed ports, 
together with the ships inside the ports, with heavier bomb loads than those carried by 
any other American aircraft. Alternatively, B-29s could have attacked ports beyond the 
reach of any other Allied aircraft, thus increasing the number of points at which the 
Japanese merchant marine suffered damage and decreasing the number of places where 
Japanese ships could safely hide from Allied submarines. B-29s also would have 
excelled, did in fact excel throughout the last year of the war, as long range, high-
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capacity dispensers of naval mines used to damage, harass, and channel enemy shipping.  
B-29s definitely did not serve as the weapon of choice for attacking individual ships at 
sea, but even in this area another heavy bomber type, the B-24, proved quite useful 
during the Battle of the Atlantic.110 
Whether all of these uses would have been a wasteful duplication of effort is a 
question that can be answered by reference to long-standing principles of war: the 
principle of mass dictates that forces should be massed at the point of main effort. The B-
29 proved to be an exemplary tool for attacking shipping, if it were not useful then its use 
against shipping would clearly be unjustifiable; B-29 mining complemented the efforts of 
submarines and smaller aircraft in the war against shipping not only by simple 
destruction but by delaying and rerouting Japanese ships, channeling them toward waters 
where other menaces knew to lurk. The concentration of strategic assets to achieve 
tactical goals may be justifiable only in extreme circumstances, such as the arguably 
worthwhile rail bombing campaign in northern France and the Low Countries before the 
Normandy invasion, but Japanese shipping as a whole constituted a strategic, rather than 
a tactical target. Japan’s shipping, the key link in the Japanese economic chain, was 
already being attacked at every opportunity by submarines, land- and carrier- based 
aircraft, and surface ships—shipping was what the Twentieth Bomber Command should 
have targeted.111 
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In order to prove that strategic bombing really could work, Army Air Force 
planners wanted to aim the Twentieth Bomber Command at the Japanese steel industry, 
despite the obvious difficulties of China and the real advantages of attacking shipping. 
Some targets within the steel industry lay on Kyushu and the United States Army Air 
Force wanted to begin an early bombardment of Japan, ignoring the fact that 
Matterhorn’s main targets lay not in Japan proper but in Manchuria. In choosing China, 
planners ignored the facts that any operation conducted over the Himalayan Mountains 
using bombers to carry their own supplies could not possibly qualify as sustained and 
thus could not realistically expect to achieve decisive results. Some planners also felt that 
steel served as the most important, accessible, strategic target but many other planners 
believed that shipping placed equal to or even higher than steel in any computation of 
relative values. The latter were correct: shipping served as the single most important 
target within the Japanese empire. Japan's steel industry operated below capacity, in spite 
of Japan's tremendous need for steel, because the amount of merchant shipping that was 
available to the empire proved insufficient to meet Japanese needs. The best method by 
which to further reduce Japanese steel production was not to attack partially redundant 
steel facilities but to further reduce Japan's available shipping, a process that would yield 
the side benefit of reducing many other aspects of Japanese military and economic 
activity as well. The fact that the United States military charged across the Pacific Ocean, 
ever farther ahead of the planned timetable, also limited the utility of attacks against steel 
because steel would serve as a more valuable target in a long than a short war. Even 
before Matterhorn definitely failed, planners essentially conceded the validity of the 
arguments against targeting the Japanese steel industry by planning to transfer the 
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Twentieth out of China as soon as bases in the Mariana Islands could be made 
operational.112 
 Twentieth Bomber Command's air squadrons flew out of the United States in late-
March and arrived in Kharagpur, India in April 1944. The Twentieth then began to divide 
its ground crewmen between India and the bases around Chengtu, China and to build-up 
supplies. Placing the majority of its maintenance facilities in India, the Twentieth planned 
to stage through Chinese bases to attack targets in Manchuria and Japan and on Formosa. 
The bases in India and at China Bay, Ceylon served when the Twentieth conducted 
operations directed toward Indo-China, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies. The 
coke ovens of the Japanese steel industry served as the primary targets of operation 
Matterhorn, but planners also marked numerous, secondary targets for destruction.113 
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 The Fifty-eighth Bombardment Wing (Very Heavy) of the Twentieth Bomber 
Command encamped on mainland Asia on a quest “to achieve the progressive destruction 
and dislocation of the Japanese military, industrial and economic systems and the 
undermining of the morale of the Japanese people to a point where capacity for armed 
resistance is decisively weakened.”114 The Seventy-third Bombardment Wing (Very 
Heavy) originally planned to join the effort at a later date but deployed instead to the 
Mariana Islands as a component of the Twenty-first Bomber Command after the Fifty-
eighth proved the utter unsuitability of Chinese basing. A mere sixteen squadrons of one 
hundred forty-four total B-29s, manned and supported by over twenty thousand men, thus 
comprised the whole effort of the Twentieth in Operation Matterhorn. The small size of 
the ultimate force notwithstanding, engineers constructed the Chengtu facilities and 
defensive forces accumulated to protect those facilities as if the involved bomber force 
were twice the size that the Twentieth actually attained. Furthermore, the task of 
adequately supplying even the reduced Matterhorn force proved to be beyond the 
available capabilities of the United States. The small size of the Matterhorn force, 
logistical difficulties, and training deficiencies condemned Operation Matterhorn to fail 
to achieve its objectives.115 
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 Japanese aircraft posed the only immediate threat to the Twentieth Bomber 
Command’s advance bases around Chengtu, China. Guided to their targets by fires lit by 
irregular forces on the ground and aided in their efforts by occasional sabotage against 
the American installations, Japanese aircraft frequently visited Chengtu. Attacking in 
small numbers, usually at night, Japanese activities never seriously threatened Matterhorn 
and rarely inflicted damage, but over the course of months the toll added up to a 
significant drain on the efforts of both the Twentieth and the Air Transport Command, 
which used the fields while moving supplies into and within China. On one particularly 
successful raid, on November 21, 1944, two Japanese aircraft heavily damaged three B-
29s and a C-109 besides destroying and damaging various other supplies.116  
 The Fourteenth Air Force carried the responsibility for providing protection for 
Chengtu against such raids, but never succeeded in preventing pinprick, night raids by 
Japanese bombers. The Fourteenth deployed the Three Hundred Twelfth Fighter Wing, 
with two squadrons of gas guzzling P-47 fighters and with two squadrons of older model 
P-51s, at the six fighter bases around Chengtu to serve as daytime interceptors; of these, 
the P-47s possessed too short a range and too high a fuel consumption for more offensive 
use by the Fourteenth, but the force quickly put an end to Japanese thoughts of daytime 
attacks against Chengtu. Japanese night operations remained essentially unhindered by 
Allied air opposition until a single flight of P-61s of the Four Hundred Twenty-sixth 
Night Fighter Squadron began operating near Chengtu in October 1944. This flight, the 
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first Allied night fighters in the theater, built up to squadron strength, gained practice, and 
began to shoot down occasional Japanese raiders, but not even these hunters in the 
darkness could put a stop to the Japanese nighttime attacks that continued, albeit with 
decreasing effect and frequency, until well into 1945. Japanese attacks against Chengtu 
drew Allied aircraft and supplies into a nearly irrelevant and largely uneventful defensive 
battle wherein a handful of Japanese attackers tied down larger numbers of American 
aircraft while suffering few, and inflicting only slightly more, losses.117 
 While considerable, resources consumed by defensive efforts against Japanese 
attacks, even taken together with damage inflicted by the attacks themselves, paled in 
comparison to the assets consumed by the Twentieth Bomber Command in the course of 
its lifespan, and first among those resources were those consumed by the construction of 
the Twentieth’s various airfields. The United States paid approximately one hundred fifty 
million American dollars to the Chinese government for four bomber and six fighter 
bases around Chengtu, China. Up to three hundred sixty-five thousand Chinese peasants: 
men, women, and children, worked on site at any given time, almost entirely by hand, for 
a period of six months. The United States also paid an additional twenty million dollars 
for thirty-three thousand American and Indian soldiers and civilians to enlarge five, fair 
weather bases at Kharagpur, India over the course of four months, but without making the 
bases capable of monsoon season operations. Finally, the enlargement and modernization 
of a single airbase at China Bay, Ceylon cost the United States a modest sum of money. 
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By way of comparison, less than four thousand United States soldiers built the eventual 
B-29 bases on Saipan, in the Mariana Islands, in just over three months without paying 
exorbitant exchange rates or drafting farmers from the fields of countries ripped by 
malnutrition.118 
After deployment, the Twentieth Bomber Command suffered more from the 
pernicious effects of supply deprivation than from enemy action. In anticipation of the 
excellent results that planners expected from the late 1943 heightening of the strategic 
bombing campaign against Germany, planners at the Quebec Conference in August 1943 
agreed to provide hundreds of B-24 bombers from Europe for conversion to C-87 cargo 
and C-109 tanker transports to provide the logistical support that Operation Matterhorn 
required. As Germany proved more resilient than anticipated, the Eighth and Fifteenth 
Air Forces in Europe expended some of those B-24s in combat and could not spare most 
of the others from bombing efforts, thus depriving Matterhorn of its planned support 
mechanism and calling the entire operation into question, until the decision was made to 
use the B-29s themselves to transport supplies from India to China. Though the decision 
to make the Matterhorn force primarily responsible for its own airlift between India and 
China occurred well before the Twentieth began operations, the decision filtered its way 
only fitfully through the chain of command, causing confusion, surprise, bad feelings, 
and low combat sortie rates for months after the Twentieth began combat operations but 
unexpectedly remained the major link in the its own logistical chain over the Himalayan 
Mountains. The Japanese Ichigo offensive further aggravated the Twentieth’s logistical 
situation by encouraging the Fourteenth Air Force to divert its combat attention from 
anti-shipping and counter-air operations to relatively more intense ground support 
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operations, and its transport attention to ferrying Chinese troops, both in order to protect 
its airfields and to assist the Chinese Army. To support the Fourteenth’s increased sortie 
rate and to make up for what the Fourteenth failed to move while it moved Chinese 
troops instead, the Joint Chiefs of Staff allocated a larger than planned share of the 
logistical support that trickled over the Himalayas from India via the Air Transport 
Command to the Fourteenth, thus undercutting the Twentieth even before the Twentieth 
began its own operations.119 
Twentieth Bomber Command remained primarily responsible for moving its 
logistical support from India to China for the first six months of its operational 
experience. Twenty C-87s flew to Asia to support Operation Matterhorn in January 1944 
and labored alone until the Twentieth’s one hundred forty-four B-29s arrived in March 
and April of that year, carrying a spare engine each and immediately commencing supply 
runs over the Himalayas. Three squadrons of C-54s and C-46s joined the Air Transport 
Command in North Africa to help speed critical cargo to the Twentieth in Asia, but C-46s 
only gradually filtered into the Twentieth’s Hump and intra-China airlift efforts, 
beginning in April 1944 and reaching a strength of thirty-eight aircraft by the end of 
August of that year. Finally, in September 1944, the long-awaited C-109 tankers began to 
arrive in India, but severe maintenance difficulty and Hump orientation training rendered 
them nearly ineffective until well into October as the force built up to an eventual seventy 
airplanes. The Twentieth’s B-29 squadrons experienced their own difficulties during 
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supply missions: the bombers lacked specialized conversion equipment that would have 
allowed them to carry larger loads and bases in India lay well beyond a thousand miles 
and one very large mountain range away from Chengtu, leaving little fuel to be drained 
from the fuel tanks in China for each supply sortie flown. Growing experience and the 
eviction of the Japanese from northern Burma by Stilwell’s forces combined to assist the 
Twentieth to achieve greater efficiency; for example, the bombers eventually began to 
offload most of their machinegun ammunition in China on each supply sortie, both in 
order to save fuel on the return trip and for use by the Fourteenth Air Force in return for a 
portion of its Hump tonnage. Regardless of improvements in technique and support, 
however, for their entire stay on mainland Asia the Twentieth’s B-29s spent most of their 
flying hours, two thousand three hundred seventy eight of their first two thousand eight 
hundred sixty seven B-29 hours and often a week per combat mission later in the 
campaign, hauling supplies from India to China.120 
One of the logistical difficulties facing the Twentieth Bomber Command was 
maintenance. The B-29 carried numerous, innovative features to aid crews in flight that 
required intensive maintenance by highly skilled mechanics on the ground. The R-3350 
engine ranked chief among trouble causing mechanisms on the B-29; it tended to explode 
without warning while in flight and suffered so badly from dust that each B-29 deploying 
from the United States to India carried a spare engine and parts rather than its full combat 
crew, as had been planned. Experience improved maintenance, of course, so that the July 
1944 average of eight hours of maintenance per hour that the aircraft spent in flight fell, 
by January 1945, to two hours forty-eight minutes. These maintenance hours, combined 
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with the splitting of ground crews between the China and India bases, nailed the 
Twentieth’s average B-29 to the ground for days between supply runs and sorties during 
the early months of Operation Matterhorn. Such immobility served to warn the Japanese 
of impending missions, presented lucrative targets to Japanese attackers, and delayed the 
logistical build-ups for every mission.121 
Twentieth Bomber Command suffered more than simply a reduced sortie rate 
from its dearth of logistical support. The Forward Echelon Detachment, which served full 
time in China, “felt like orphans,” with predictable results for morale and efficiency until 
late in August 1944, when the first comfort supplies and entertainment began to arrive. 
For its entire stay in China, the Detachment also coped with a severe, if slowly 
alleviating, shortage of automotive vehicles and the logistical support and maintenance 
personnel to care for the vehicles available. Some of the few available vehicles aided 
continuing work to expand the Chengtu airfields and transfer supplies between the 
Chengtu area bases, thus leaving even fewer available for use in maintenance and 
command and control tasks.  Morale suffered due to lack of working vehicles, but the 
problem also directly inhibited aircraft maintenance and servicing and security 
arrangements for the entire base area.122 
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After two months of supply flights, many conducted as practice combat missions 
in an unsatisfactory arrangement that provided neither adequate quality of training nor 
efficient movement of supplies, the Twentieth Bomber Command planned to begin 
combat operations with an acknowledgement of its inadequate training and a gesture to 
the ground forces in Burma and India upon whom Operation Matterhorn depended by 
attacking a Bangkok, Thailand railroad yard. Flying from India to conserve Hump airlift 
tonnage, the Twentieth hoped to taste combat while masking its formation flying and 
gunnery inadequacies by attacking at night—until General Arnold vetoed the idea as 
being of little training value and mandated that the mission be run during daylight. On 
June 5, 1944, the Twentieth launched ninety-eight B-29s against Bangkok, lost five 
aircraft to various causes, and actually bombed the target with seventy-seven B-29s 
carrying an average of nearly five tons of bombs each. Fifty B-29s dropped their bombs 
by radar aiming, but neither they nor their visually bombing compatriots aimed very well, 
with fewer than twenty bombs hitting within the target area, an area vastly larger than 
Matterhorn’s primary coke oven targets, and correspondingly modest damage inflicted 
upon the rail facilities. The raid exhibited the poor training of the Twentieth, which 
difficulty set the pattern for most of the Twentieth’s early operations.123 
Mission number two by the Twentieth Bomber Command marked the beginning 
of the coke, iron, and steel attacks that formed the centerpiece of the Operation 
Matterhorn plan. On the night of June 15, 1944, sixty-eight of the ninety-two B-29s that 
staged from Kharagpur to Chengtu the previous day took off to attack the massive 
Yawata steel factory and fewer than sixty dropped their bombs anywhere near the 
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massive Yawata complex. Seven B-29s fell to Japanese defenses or mechanical 
difficulties too severe to survive and the two tons of bombs dropped per aircraft inflicted 
no useful damage upon the Yawata complex, though several bombs hit other industrial 
targets in the general vicinity of Yawata. Mission number two consumed the bulk of the 
four thousand tons of supplies stockpiled around Chengtu during the laborious buildup 
from April to mid-June 1944 and necessitated a long stand down from combat operations 
for further logistical efforts.124 
Six weeks lay between missions two and four of the Twentieth Bomber 
Command. The force concentrated upon ferrying desperately needed supplies and 
conducting desperately needed training, hoping to continue its coke, iron, and steel 
program with renewed vigor after building up a huge stockpile of supplies in China. As if 
to keep American morale up and Japanese morale down in the midst of the hiatus, on the 
night of July 7, eighteen of twenty-eight B-29s staged at Chengtu attacked several targets 
in the Japanese home islands but neither inflicted nor, given the lack of photographic 
follow-up, expected noticeable damage with their roughly two tons of bombs per 
plane.125 
Missions number four, seven, eight, and nine followed in a comparatively rapid 
fashion as the Twentieth Bomber Command strove, and failed, to achieve the primary 
objective of Operation Matterhorn, the destruction of Japanese coking capacity. The 
Twentieth launched three daylight missions against the crucial Showa steel factory at 
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Anshan, Manchuria and another day mission, with a small nighttime follow up, against 
the Yawata steel factory in Japan, between July 29 and September 26, 1944. During the 
course of these raids, the proportion of B-29s airborne from Chengtu rose noticeably, a 
reflection of improving maintenance, and their bomb loads increased equally 
impressively, reflecting improving crew skills, but results from these more impressive 
raids failed to impress planners with the chances for the Twentieth to complete its coke, 
iron, and steel program soon enough to matter to the outcome of the war. Day and night 
strikes against Yawata on August 20 and 21 failed to inflict substantial damage and the 
daytime raid cost the Twentieth eleven B-29s destroyed, an unsustainable fifteen percent 
casualty rate. Each of the first two raids against Showa inflicted damage rated as “good” 
or “useful” at the time and subsequently revealed to have been slightly better than that, 
costing the Japanese Empire between one and six percent of a year’s coke and a small 
amount of pig iron production; the third strike encountered total overcast and the radar 
aimed bombings failed to inflict noticeable new damage.126 
 Missions number five and six filled out the coke, iron, and steel phase of 
Operation Matterhorn, although both were flown to achieve ulterior objectives and 
neither touched directly upon the Japanese steel industry. Mission number five served the 
diplomatic end of satiating British pressure for action in Southeast Asia when fifty-four 
of fifty-nine aircraft staged to China Bay, Ceylon attacked the Pladjoe oil refinery in 
Palembang, Sumatra on the night of August 10, 1944. Thirty-nine B-29s bombed the 
refinery with one ton of bombs each and achieved what were believed, and turned out to 
be, minimal results, except that one B-29 failed to return to base. Several B-29s that 
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conducted a mine dropping mission into the river that provided oceanic access to the 
refinery achieved much greater results, sinking three and damaging four ships and closing 
the river to traffic for nearly a month. Mission number six brought twenty-four of twenty-
nine airborne aircraft, four more lay broken at Chengtu, over Nagasaki on the night of 
August 11 in a test run of fire bombing techniques. Roughly three tons of bombs per 
aircraft failed to inflict much damage, two B-29s failed to return to base, and the results 
proved so inconclusive that the Committee of Operations Analysts continued to discuss 
the testing of firebombing techniques as if no test had yet been made a month later.127 
 By the end of September 1944, the Army Air Force ended the Twentieth Bomber 
Command’s attack upon Japan's coke ovens after total losses of thirty-five B-29s. The 
September 14 meeting of the Committee of Operations Analysts recognized the 
Twentieth’s meager accomplishments and the essential uselessness of continuing the 
effort, to which observations the Joint Chiefs of Staff responded by canceling the coke, 
iron, and steel phase of Operation Matterhorn after the failed Anshan III raid on 
September 26. Given the apparent, and actual, lack of success that the Twentieth 
achieved in attempting to bomb Japanese coke ovens and recognizing that if the operation 
became more successful then the Japanese might simply overrun the Chinese capital at 
Chungking and the American air hub at Kunming, even if they chose not to march vastly 
further to seize the Chengtu airfields, the Joint Chiefs decided that the Twentieth should 
begin bombing targets of more direct interest to the fighting fronts while awaiting 
transfer to better bases. The Joint Chiefs directed the second phase of Matterhorn 
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predominantly against Japanese aircraft strength and against lines of communication in 
an effort to disrupt the Japanese military in the field.128 
 The Twentieth Bomber Command conducted its last thirty-five missions between 
October 1944 and March 1945 as it shifted targets and began to move itself back out of 
China. Contrary to assessments at the time, the Twentieth achieved its most useful 
strategic results during four, major, numbered and several smaller, unnumbered mine 
dropping missions against ports and rivers across Southeast and East Asia; this mining 
sank or damaged numerous ships and disrupted Japanese shipping and war production. 
Complementing these efforts, several major and numerous minor strikes against port and 
dockyard facilities in China, Taiwan, and Indochina damaged or sank several ships and 
further disrupted Japanese shipping, war production, and naval vessel repair. Of larger 
note at the time but of lesser actual strategic value, the Twentieth repeatedly visited 
aircraft factories at Omura on Kyushu; Mukden, Manchuria; and Okayama, Taiwan, 
effectively destroying the never completed Omura plant, totally destroying the Okayama 
plant in conjunction with strikes by naval aircraft, and inflicting heavy damage on both 
the Mukden aircraft plant and an adjoining arsenal. As Allied operations in the Philippine 
Islands began and intensified, and after the Twentieth gave up its truly strategic efforts, 
numerous strikes by the Twentieth against airfields and aircraft depots in China and 
Taiwan provided operational support for Allied forces struggling to overcome massive air 
and kamikaze attacks in the Philippine Islands campaigns. The Twentieth rounded out its 
efforts by bombing rail yards and a bridge in Burma and Thailand and by joining the 
Fourteenth Air Force in conducting the first successful fire bombing of the war in Asia to 
destroy nearly half of Hankow, a large, port city and component of the Wuhan 
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conurbation in central China, in an effort to slow the Ichigo offensive in China and aid 
Allied offensives in Burma.129 
  The Twentieth Bomber Command failed to successfully carry out the mission 
outlined for it in Operation Matterhorn. The Twentieth could not hope to sustain a 
meaningful effort against the Japanese home islands and failed in the only slightly less 
impossible task of destroying accessible Japanese coke ovens. Lack of logistical support 
and insufficient training of the Twentieth’s air and ground crews doomed Matterhorn to 
failure, and poor intelligence added to the difficulties faced by the Twentieth. The 
Twentieth spent a vast majority of its flight hours wearing out its aircraft conducting 
inefficient supply missions and achieved significant proficiency, through expensive on 
the job training, only late in the operation, long after failing to achieve its strategic goals. 
Photographic reconnaissance, when the Twentieth could provide it, misled planners to 
underrate the already anemic results that the Twentieth achieved and to call off the coke, 
iron, and steel phase of the operation earlier than might have otherwise been the case, 
actually saving the Twentieth further effort in a hopeless cause and allowing other targets 
to be hit in the place of further missions to Yawata and Anshan. 
Poor maintenance crew training kept the Twentieth Bomber Command’s B-29s on 
the ground for long, but steadily shrinking, periods of time between missions, but it was 
poor aircrew training that drove the stake through the heart of Operation Matterhorn. 
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Aircrew proved unable to operate their aircraft at anything approaching the aircraft’s 
planned capabilities—a defect that only slowly improved between long maintenance lulls 
as the crews honed their skills by flying dangerous combat sorties and grueling cargo 
missions. Ill-trained crews consumed too much fuel during their operations not only 
because of simple, technical misunderstandings but also because they frequently made 
errors in navigation and had serious difficulty assembling into and maintaining formation. 
Poor fuel management necessarily resulted in reduced bomb loads and the inability to 
assemble into formations reduced the footprint left by the formation’s bombs even 
further, thus reducing a formation’s chances to hit its target at all, if it could even find the 
target area. These factors conspired to make the Twentieth miss its targets more often 
than anyone believed possible and, when hitting the target area, to still inflict relatively 
little damage. These problems in daylight flying skill areas combined with the 
Twentieth’s inadequate gunnery training and led planners to decide to send the Twentieth 
on a number of night missions.130 
On night missions, the Twentieth Bomber Command proved even less effective 
than it did during the day. B-29s flew either singly or in very small groups at night 
because the Japanese Empire possessed relatively few night fighter aircraft, formation 
flying at night could be disastrous and would certainly be difficult, and flying alone 
allowed greater bomb and smaller fuel loads because each aircraft proceeded without 
regard to the behavior of any or many fellow aircraft. Given that solo bombing 
theoretically places each bomber’s load in the exact center of the aiming area, bombing 
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accuracy might be expected to improve at night, but when inexperienced crews often 
failed to find their target areas, and then aimed using radars with which they initially 
lacked noticeable training, theoretical accuracy became unattainable. The small bomb 
footprint resulting from tiny nighttime formations and the inability to accurately aim 
using radar made the Twentieth’s accuracy at night even worse than its accuracy during 
the day.131 
 Although Operation Matterhorn proved a failure, the Twentieth Bomber 
Command’s attacks did damage the Japanese steel and merchant shipping industries. 
Three raids against Yawata inflicted little useful damage, but three larger raids against 
Anshan cost the Japanese between one and six percent of the empire’s total, annual, steel 
production by destroying several batteries of coke ovens; the Japanese could have 
restored production levels, but only by diverting merchant shipping away from more 
pressing duties to carrying coal from Manchuria to Japan. The Twentieth added to that 
problem too, by destroying and delaying shipping through mining and bombing ports. 
Counterfactually, however, if the Twentieth had managed to overcome its training and 
maintenance problems and to become a serious threat to Japan, then Matterhorn would 
still have failed; the Japanese Imperial Army could conduct ground raids against Chengtu 
or simple ground conquest of Kunming and Chungking, to complement or replace aerial 
raids that could themselves have been increased in intensity.132 
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 The Twentieth Bomber Command contributed to Allied victory in World War II 
predominantly by helping to solve two of the problems that bedeviled the Twentieth 
throughout its career: intelligence and training. The Twentieth began operating over 
Japan and Manchuria using predominantly outdated intelligence of insufficient scope and 
suffered accordingly, but helped to solve the problem by using photographic B-29s, at 
first strictly ad hoc creations and later the dedicated F-13 variant, to provide Allied 
planners with massive quantities of their first aerial photographs of Japanese installations 
and activities across a huge swath of eastern Asia. The Twentieth also discovered how to 
fly and maintain a new and powerful type of aircraft, riddled with teething pains, that 
eventually laid waste to much of Japan when it came into more intensified use from 
island bases closer to that country than the Twentieth ever based.133 
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  CHAPTER 7 
ONE AIR FORCE, TWO CONTRADICTIONS 
 
 In hindsight, the Fourteenth Air Force’s offensive operations in 1945 appear to be 
little more than the continuation of an old policy, carried forward by inertia and executed 
by the Fourteenth’s increasingly numerous and wide-ranging squadrons. In fact, however, 
in 1945 the Fourteenth acted in accordance first with its own ideas of how best to hurt the 
Japanese and later with Lieutenant General Wedemeyer’s Beta plan, as okayed by 
Generalissimo Chiang, on a twice contradictory mission to sever the lines of 
communications that connected Japanese forces in southern China with Shanghai and the 
northern China ports and with Manchuria. This portion of the Beta plan aimed to inhibit 
Japanese economic exploitation of China and to weaken Japanese forces in southern 
China by reducing their logistical support, essentially by destroying every accessible rail 
car and riverboat in occupied China. Overall, the Beta plan aimed to drive a Chinese 
army to the coast and either seize a port or reoccupy an abandoned port as the Japanese 
withdrew, essentially voluntarily but under pressure, from southern China. That the 
Fourteenth, rather than encouraging Japanese departure by bombing supply dumps and 
barracks and fielded troops, actually worked to prevent Japanese withdrawal by 
destroying the means of their departure, serves as the first contradiction of the 
Fourteenth’s efforts in 1945. That one of the geo-strategic goals of the United States 
effort in China, to help to establish a strong, non-communist, Chinese regime for the 
post-war world, was actively undermined by the destruction of the infrastructure of a 
China about to be freed of enemy occupation in military activities designed to serve a 
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merely operational goal, serves as the second contradiction of the Fourteenth’s efforts in 
1945.134 
 By 1945, Japanese exports from occupied China, outside of Manchuria, virtually 
ceased. United States’ intelligence reports correctly indicated that Japan moved virtually 
no economic traffic on rail lines south of the Yangtze River and only barely more on rail 
lines between the Yangtze and Pe-p’ing (Beijing). Traffic leaving the Yangtze River 
valley often went by river vessel along that watery highway but Fourteenth Air Force 
interdiction reduced the amount of traffic by ninety-two percent between early 1943 and 
1945. By 1945, the Japanese only conducted systematic economic activity in China 
beyond the reach of the Fourteenth, in Manchuria and far northeastern China. To begin 
economic exploitation of southern China, or to renew it in the Yangtze valley, the 
Japanese would have had to install occupation mechanisms in southern China to enable 
that exploitation and give up the troop withdrawals that both the Japanese and the Allies 
planned on having occur; either would give the Fourteenth ample warning to renew 
interdiction before substantial economic advantage could accrue. Before beginning its 
interdiction campaign, the Fourteenth had already essentially eliminated the possibility of 
achieving any economic objectives.135 
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Whatever the value of China’s railroads to the Japanese economy, the Japanese 
Imperial Army valued them rather highly as the only means by which to operate forces in 
northern China and extricate forces from southern China. Japanese forces in China drew 
approximately eighty percent of their required food and general supplies from local 
sources and much of their ordnance from captured Chinese stockpiles, but the remainder 
of the logistical support required by Japanese forces in China, together with virtually all 
of the strictly military supplies for forces in Southeast Asia, flowed across China’s 
railroads by spring 1945. Japanese plans called for a withdrawal from southern China, the 
formation of static fronts along the Yangtze and facing the Soviet Union in Manchuria, a 
strong, static, coastal defense of Korea and North China, and a strong mobile force to 
back up the static forces; the railroads remained the only source of strategic mobility for 
Japanese forces on mainland Asia to move to their new deployment areas, as the Beta 
planners hoped they would. The Japanese Army depended upon having operable Chinese 
railroads in order to shift forces to counter Allied landings along the China coast, to move 
forces between the China front, the coast, and Manchuria, and to transfer forces from 
southern China to the north; the Allies depended upon the Japanese having the ability to 
leave southern China, which ability only the railroad could provide.136 
Besides premising the Beta plan on the expected Japanese withdrawal from 
southern China, other diplomatic and military reasons existed for wanting the Japanese to 
withdraw unimpeded from the region. The western Allies pleaded repeatedly throughout 
the war with Premier Joseph Stalin to bring the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, 
to be met repeatedly with Stalin’s promise that the Soviet Union would indeed attack 
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Japan shortly after achieving victory in Europe. Stalin’s promises could have been taken 
with caution, but Soviet expansionism in Finland, the Baltic States, Poland, and Rumania, 
historical Russian interest in Manchuria, and Russo-Japanese rivalry in the Far East gave 
good cause to take Stalin at his word on this topic. Given the ability of the Red Army to 
defeat Japanese Imperial Army repeatedly on their mutual frontier during the late-1930s 
and the amazingly powerful forces that the Red Army built up to destroy the Wermacht, 
itself a far better equipped force than the Japanese Imperial Army, there could be no 
question of the outcome of any struggle between the opposing forces in Manchuria. 
Allowing Japanese forces to leave would even have followed Sun Tzu’s dictums of never 
thwarting an enemy returning home and always leaving an escape route for a surrounded 
enemy, arguments that might have appealed especially to Generalissimo Chiang, himself 
a product of China’s famous Wampoa military academy. Even given the apparent 
reputation of the Kwantung Army as being Japan’s best, a reputation not apparently 
earned by any particular martial deeds, the United States and Chinese governments 
should have been happy to see Japanese forces moving toward Manchuria. 137 
 The year 1945 dawned as both the Allied offensive in Burma and the Japanese 
Ichigo offensive in China ground to a halt. On the Salween River front, facing south 
toward Burma, the Chinese concluded their first successful major offensive in recent 
memory in January 1945 and began to transfer troops from there toward the main front in 
southeastern China while the Chinese Army in India and other Allied forces continued to 
grind eastward into Japanese lines. Japanese forces, meanwhile, drove the suddenly 
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uncooperative French out of northern Indochina and briefly connected that portion of 
their empire with Japanese controlled territory in southern China, before abandoning the 
connection due to changed strategic guidance and ending Ichigo. Japanese forces did not 
rest, however, as two smaller offensives in South China succeeded Ichigo and continued 
the destruction of the Fourteenth Air Force’s bases in the area in a process that finally 
ended in May, as Chinese resistance stiffened and Japanese forces turned back from 
further conquest.138 
 As Ichigo died away, the Fourteenth Air Force turned its attention away from 
close air support and battlefield interdiction and immediately launched into its China-
wide interdiction campaign. Throughout late-1944, the Fourteenth retained a generally 
constant strength; in November of that year the Fourteenth deployed nearly four hundred 
fighters, nearly one hundred medium bombers, nearly fifty heavy bombers, and perhaps 
three dozens reconnaissance aircraft. While the overall number of American troops in the 
China Theater increased dramatically beginning in 1945, the Fourteenth actually grew 
very little until units of the Tenth Air Force began to move into China as the war was 
ending in summer 1945. The Fourteenth did, however, receive steadily more up-to-date 
models of aircraft and increased its combat power and range as a result. Tonnage also 
flowed over the Himalayan Mountains in dramatically increasing tonnage in 1945, as 
larger transport aircraft such as the C-54 replaced smaller ones such as the C-47, as the 
clearing of North Burma allowed the Ledo Road to open, for a more efficient transit of 
heavy equipment, and transport aircraft to fly a safer and lower altitude route through the 
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Himalayas, and as pipelines laid along the road supplied fuel without regard to weather or 
traffic jams.139 
 Within China, another change took place in the late spring of 1945: the American 
program to train and equip Chinese divisions finally began to bear fruit and Lieutenant 
General Wedemeyer, whose personal manner failed to irritate Generalissimo Chiang 
where General Stilwell’s prickliness had infuriated him, finally managed to gain some 
useful power to influence the Chinese Army. A spearhead composed of two divisions of 
the excellent Chinese Army in India, flown into China at great expense in order to save 
the city and air hub of Kweilin from the Ichigo offensive, led eleven other Chinese 
divisions, which had recently completed a three month training course and received a 
useful amount of American equipment, in an offensive toward Canton. These Chinese 
divisions marched and fought without suffering from the usual malnutrition that left a 
trail of corpses behind the average Chinese formation on the march because 
Wedemeyer’s staff coordinated the purchase and distribution of food for these units 
without interference by Chinese commanders. The system worked; the troops gained 
weight and stamina, morale increased along with combat effectiveness, and the troops 
came victorious out of a skirmish against a Japanese rear guard. Then the Twentieth Air 
Force dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Soviet forces overran 
Manchuria in a matter of days, smashing the vaunted Kwantung Army. The Chinese 
offensive halted to find out what it all meant and never resumed. Japan surrendered a 
month before Chinese forces would have captured the undefended port of Fort Bayard 
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and opened a direct line of supply into China from the United States for the first time 
since 1938.140 
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 CHAPTER 8 
UPDATING THE DISCUSSION 
 
The historiography of the United States war effort in China during World War II 
began in 1942, using glowing reports of the activities of the “Flying Tigers” American 
Volunteer Group, to raise morale in the United States when Allied forces in every other 
theater of war seemed to be undergoing a series of disasters. During the fifty-five years 
following the ending of World War II, historiography of the American aerial effort in 
China broadened to include limited discussions about the Twentieth Bomber Command 
and the later tactical activities of forces under the command of Major General Chennault. 
The Wesley Craven and James Cate series The Army Air Forces in World War II even 
includes a sort of dry review of the accomplishments of the Fourteenth Air Force after the 
end of Operations Ichigo and Matterhorn. Beyond these limited areas of coverage, 
historical discussion is essentially non-existent. Overall, historical coverage of and debate 
over the American aerial effort in China during World War II is topically limited and 
lacking in depth. 
The American Volunteer Group episode is by far the most written about aspect of 
the American air war in China. Robert Scott’s famous God is my co-pilot arrived in 1943, 
followed by Flying Tiger: Chennault of China in 1959, and a series of similar, popular, 
tactical and personality oriented works has continued to be published ever since the war, 
highlighted by Major General Chennault’s own Way of a fighter; the memoirs of Claire 
Lee Chennault in 1949. This string of books often emphasizes a degree of hero worship 
and an unquestioning acceptance that air power is of utmost importance in war while 
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glossing over the logistical and strategic issues that framed the decisions that resulted in 
the events covered: these books are, in essence, popular history. Such works as Daniel 
Ford’s Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and the American Volunteer Group provide a 
more balanced coverage of both the events within the air campaign in China and, more 
importantly, of the trade-offs and decisions that made those events possible. Given the 
historical situation, it is difficult to argue with the assessment that the United States did 
what little it could early in the war in order to help China and hinder the Japanese; little 
more could have been done, especially involving ground forces, and the morale and 
military value of China clearly outweighed what a couple of hundred of obsolescent 
aircraft could have achieved elsewhere in the world.141 
 The history of the Fourteenth Air Force during 1943 and 1944 is less written 
about than is the earlier period. Some admirers of Major General Chennault continued 
their popular histories into this period, finding support from A.B. Feuer’s General 
Chennault's secret weapon: the B-24 in China: based on the diary and notes of Captain 
Elmer E. Haynes; Barbara Tuchman’s Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 
1911–45 counters their attacks on General Stilwell by pointing out that while Chennault’s 
plans failed, the Chinese never allowed Stilwell to attempt to execute his plans for the 
Chinese Army. Michael Schaller presents a more balanced view of the dispute in The 
U.S. Crusade in China, 1938–1945 as he proves that while Chennault’s plans failed, the 
Kuomintang had no intention of even allowing Stilwell to attempt reform in China. After 
the translation and release of captured Japanese plans, no one disputes that Ichigo aimed 
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primarily to drive the Fourteenth out of southern China. The larger strategic situation is 
the missing link in the historiography of the Fourteenth Air Force’s growth and early 
employment. No previous author discusses the fact that the assets, especially the B-24s, 
deployed to build the China Air Task Force into the Fourteenth failed to achieve, indeed 
could hardly have achieved, the strategic mission of aiding China, but could have 
usefully served elsewhere. In early and mid-1942, a crisis in the more important North 
African Theater siphoned all excess strength away from the Tenth Air Force in China-
Burma-India, but perhaps because of inter-service rivalry, the same recognition of 
priorities did not manifest itself in the face of the even more critical Battle of the 
Atlantic.142 
 Given that the atomic age began with B-29s over Japan, it is no surprise that the 
history of the Twentieth Bomber Command is widely covered, but given that the Twenty-
first Bomber Command, rather than the Twentieth, conducted essentially all of the 
bombing of Japan, it is equally unsurprising that the Twentieth is generally covered only 
in the sketchiest of detail by most sources. Every source, from the American official 
history to the newest works, such as Richard Frank’s Downfall: the end of the Imperial 
Japanese empire, E. Bartlett Kerr’s Flames over Tokyo: the U.S. Army Air Force’s 
incendiary campaign against Japan, 1944–45, and Kenneth Werrell’s Blankets of Fire: 
U.S. bombers over Japan during World War II, seems to agree upon the major themes. 
The common argument says Twentieth went to China to help Generalissimo Chiang, that 
it attempted to bomb what was arguably the best available strategic target, and that the 
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failure of Operation Matterhorn was not inevitable. Further, the failed operation was so 
small that no change would have improved the outcome noticeably, and the Twentieth 
did manage two important tasks: to gather photographic intelligence and to break-in a 
new weapons system.143 
The common argument is wrong; the Twentieth could and should have achieved 
greater results and the reasons that it did not do so are not quite those that are commonly 
accepted. A squadron force of photographic B-29s based in China could have provided 
better coverage of larger areas with less effort, while the remaining fifteen squadrons of 
B-29s could have shaken down more quickly and conducted more missions against the 
more important shipping target from either India, Australia, or both than they did from 
their India-China bases. Poor training, inadequate logistical support, lack of time before 
winter, and plans to deploy the Twentieth Bomber Command from China and India to the 
Mariana Islands in early 1945 doomed Operation Matterhorn to near certain failure. The 
Army Air Force’s own bombing accuracy predictions, when cross indexed with the 
known abilities of the flight crews and ranges to the targets, clearly show that the 
Twentieth required extensive additional training, a fact already obvious in early 1944 or 
before, which it could not hope to quickly conduct while flying logistical missions. 
Without the requisite additional training, the Twentieth could not expect to consistently 
damage its very small coke oven targets, but could still have conducted successful mine 
dropping, and to a lesser extent port bombing, missions. The Army Air Force 
recommended the commitment of the B-29s to an advanced base in China and primarily 
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against the Japanese steel industry both in order to begin a strategic bombing campaign 
the result of which could be the establishment of a separate Air Force in the United States 
and to arrange a command structure that excluded, to the maximum possible extent, 
Army ground forces officers and foreign officials, while allowing General Arnold his 
first opportunity to command a combat unit. President Roosevelt accepted the 
recommendation because he believed that sending the force to China would somehow aid 
Chiang and encourage him to allow his country or his military to be reformed or 
employed in the future, in accordance with Roosevelt’s desire to have China as an 
American ally in the Far East after the war. 
 Historical studies of the strategic aspects of China Theater air activities after the 
Twentieth Bomber Command’s exit from the scene simply do not exist. Perhaps because 
Japanese aerial forces essentially vanish from the scene at the same time, those works 
that mention the topic at all are little more than listings of aircraft employed and ground 
targets attacked, without any strategic reasoning behind the operations, as if the 
Fourteenth Air Force had always attacked the Japanese and simply continued to do so out 
of habit. In fact, the Fourteenth conducted operations in 1945 in pursuit of what it 
deemed strategic objectives, the isolation and immobilization of Japanese forces in 
southern China, and a deep flaw underlay the whole concept of the Fourteenth’s plan. 
Lieutenant General Wedemeyer and Generalissimo Chiang’s Beta plan called for Chinese 
ground forces to move toward the coast beginning in summer 1945, to open a port 
through which to supply a larger training effort and a final drive to victory. The Beta plan 
spoke of attacking the Japanese but acknowledged that Chinese forces possessed no 
ability to force a Japanese retreat; the attack could only encourage and hasten the 
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expected Japanese withdrawal. The Fourteenth’s activities in 1945 rather hindered than 
























THE FOURTEENTH AND THE TWENTIETH 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
 
 During the autumn of 1995, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization waged war 
against the Serbian portion of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and except for occasional artillery 
barrages and targeting assistance by friendly ground forces based in Muslim portions of 
the country, used exclusively aircraft to conduct combat operations. During this conflict, 
the Atlantic powers carefully avoided actions that might have damaged Bosnian 
infrastructure but ravaged Serbian supply dumps and pounded fielded Serbian forces; 
Bosnia as a whole, including the Serbs, could not easily do without the former target set 
while the Serbs could not wage successful war without, and could not replace, the latter 
targets. The Atlantic powers intended to create Bosnia as an independent state and the 
intact infrastructure of the country played a critical role in the potential achievement of 
that national goal whereas Serbian forces and military supplies impeded the 
accomplishment of the goal by their very existence. Two of the lessons of air power in 
the China Theater during World War II thus manifest themselves during that Bosnian 
conflict: attack what must be destroyed in order to win and do not attack targets, the 
destruction of which will impede the achievement of national goals.144 
 Numerous lessons can be drawn from American aerial activities in the China 
Theater during World War II. In addition to the above lessons about targeting, Operation 
Matterhorn teaches that little can be achieved by attacking targets that are both very 
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difficult to hit and that require more hits to destroy than the attacking force could 
reasonably expect to achieve over the course of its operations. The China experience also 
teaches the necessity of being willing and able to sustain operations for long enough to 
achieve objectives. Security plays an important role in an operation and threats can come 
in a variety of unexpected shapes and sizes, as experience from China demonstrates. 
Technology, though a gateway to greater achievement, is also a stern master that 
experience from China teaches us will demand training if the equipment is to work 
correctly and contingency plans for when the equipment does not fulfill expectations. The 
most important lessons taught by the American aerial experience in China, however, has 
nothing to do with tactics or technology: actions must be taken in pursuit of national 
goals, with military strategy, inter-service politics, and individual gain relegated to places 
of dramatically lesser importance. 
 Any operation, whether full scale war, covert conflict, blockade, economic 
subversion, military support for a party to a conflict, or any other active foreign policy 
must be sustainable for long enough, including a margin for error, to achieve its 
objectives. The operation must be able to continue regardless of plausible environmental 
events, such as a seasonal monsoon season or the initiation of active civil war or 
governmental change in an unstable or democratic host country and the operation must 
not cause such diplomatic difficulty with other countries that national policy 
implementation is unduly inhibited in other areas. At a lower level, the operation must 
enjoy adequate logistical support, including both overall stocks and transportation to 
areas of usage, to carry the operation through to conclusion. American aerial operations 
in China clearly failed to meet several of these criteria, most notably that of logistical 
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support and reliance upon an unstable host country in China. In the future, whether 
support structures located in nominally friendly countries will remain available for use in 
the face of terrorist attack, diplomatic or religious pressure, or popular revolution may be 
uncertain and plans must account for all possibilities. For the United States and other 
countries with intercontinental force projection capability, the question might also arise 
whether the ability to project force with intercontinental bombers, aircraft carriers with 
limited ordnance stowage, or not readily replaceable cruise missiles will be sufficient if 
events do or might warrant activity over a period of weeks, as a sustained bombardment 
of Iraq in the post-Desert Storm era might require; the same question may arise for less 
capable countries such as the People’s Republic of China involved in, for instance, 
maritime sovereignty operations in the Spratley Islands if the only available tools are 
small surface combatants and short ranged fighter aircraft. 
 Any operation must be provided with security measures sufficient to counter, 
withstand, or evade plausible opposing activity directed against it. Opposing activities 
might include sabotage, terrorist attack, raids by irregular or elite forces, ground or 
airmobile attack, air or missile bombardment, blockade, attack using unconventional 
weapons, or any of a host of other possibilities, each of which must be accounted for in 
planning. Security cannot be relaxed simply because a base is located in a nominally 
neutral or geographically discontinuous state, though some security measures might be 
subject to diplomatic considerations in such a situation. American aerial operations in 
China during World War II underwent significant trauma due to insecurity and might 
have experienced further trauma had the Japanese conducted ground force raids against 
the Chengtu complex or advanced their armies to Kunming or Chungking. In the future, 
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incidents such as the bombing of the USS Cole in neutral Aden in 2000 or the continuous 
raids and ambushes conducted by Chechen irregulars against Russian security forces in 
the Caucasus throughout the 1990s will continue to threaten every sort of operation, from 
border patrol to sanctions enforcement and of course including active combat activities. 
 Every operation relies on some form of technology and that technology must be 
maintained and its users properly trained in order for the operation to succeed. 
Maintenance crews must be able to service equipment not simply in a classroom or 
training environment but also in the face of casualties, logistical shortages, lack of 
infrastructure, and poor working conditions. Operators must be trained to conduct 
operations using both the full capabilities of the equipment in all plausible conditions and 
limited capabilities in case of equipment damage or failure. Equipment that is especially 
prone to failure, such as engines on a B-29, must be especially well provided for both in 
training and in logistical support. The Twentieth Bomber Command’s failure to even 
approach success in Operation Matterhorn is most explicitly due to training and 
technology difficulties, but early in the war the China Air Task Force and Fourteenth Air 
Force suffered similar problems in China during World War II. In the future, each time a 
new ship or a new type of aircraft or missile or even something as simple as a new model 
of truck is introduced, its crews will require special and possibly lengthy training before 
being able to operate the technology to full capability. This proviso applies both to 
technologically advanced countries, such as with the 2000s French deployment of 
advanced Rafale fighters on a brand-new aircraft carrier and to less technologically 
reputable states such as Iran with its 1990s acquisition of complex and capable Kilo class 
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submarines from Russia; neither could expect to master and effectively employ such 
weapons without extensive training. 
 In any operation, the national interest must be the primary factor that influences 
what is done where and by whom. Military strategy must serve national goals and 
military operations and tactics must not work against national goals, even if any resulting 
restrictions cost time, treasure, or lives. This axiom must, however, be tempered by 
reality: if a national goal is difficult to the point of impossibility to achieve, then 
strategists must persuade national leaders to change the national goals. In any case, the 
political advancement of a particular person or branch of government must not be 
confused as being directly in the national interest. 
The American aerial effort in China during World War II fell into two conflicts 
between national interest and military or political advantage. The Twentieth Bomber 
Command experienced failure partly because Army Air Force leaders desired to retain 
maximum control over the force and intentionally deployed it to bases from which it 
could not reasonably be expected to substantially advance the national interest but where 
the force would be shielded from Army, Navy, and foreign influence to the maximum 
possible extent. The Fourteenth Air Force later conducted operations against the 
infrastructure of occupied China that materially inhibited the Chinese government’s 
reoccupation and reconstruction of southern and eastern China and thus weakened the 
Kuomintang, the American backed faction within China, in the civil war that seemed 
likely to be about to ensue. The Fourteenth conducted those operations in pursuit of the 
military goal of isolating and immobilizing Japanese forces in southern China, a military 
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strategic goal that, even had it been wise, should still have carried less weight in planning 
than the national goal of strengthening the Kuomintang-dominated Chinese government. 
The Fourteenth undoubtedly suffered fewer casualties in its tactical activities against 
undefended bridges and ill-defended trains and riverboats than it would have suffered if it 
had concentrated its efforts upon well-defended supply dumps and encamped troops, but 
that saving of lives does nothing to mitigate the fact that the actions were 
counterproductive, or at least less productive, to the achievement of national goals, than 
the alternative would have been. 
 In the future, national goals will probably remain as difficult to disentangle from 
military strategy and power politics as they have been in the past. As always, the wise 
selection of leaders provides the best insurance that activities will occur in pursuit of 
national goals, but exceptions and perceptions will color every event, regardless of 
governmental system or the intensity of patriotism of involved actors. Whether 
paramilitary Interior Ministry troops will coordinate well with Russian Army troops in 
Chechnya in the 2000s probably depends as much upon the relative power and ambitions 
of their ministerial leaders in Moscow as upon the military need to coordinate movements 
in pursuit of the national goal of pacifying Chechnya, though both forces probably desire 
to achieve that end. Likewise, whether a given military commander in Congo will rebel 
or fight against rebels, traffic in diamonds or take only governmental largesse, will 
probably depend as much upon his personal view of what is good for him and his country 
as what his superiors order him to do. 
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CHAPTER 10 
MISGUIDED, POORLY PLANNED, ILL-AIMED 
 
 Before World War II expanded to include the United States as an active 
participant, the soon to be Allies used a formula for activity in China that fit the theater 
perfectly. British, French, and Soviet aid flowed to China in a stream that ebbed or 
flowed as the situations of the donor states dictated. That aid provided useful material 
support for the Chinese military and helped to ensure that the Kuomintang leadership 
would not make peace with Japan. The United States, in the meantime, provided 
significant support to China’s military and economy and allowed China to recruit military 
personnel from the United States to form an aerial unit to support the morale of the 
Chinese populace. The policies of the United States and the Allies kept numerous 
Japanese forces tied down in China, decreased Japanese pressure on other Allied states, 
and kept China in the war and on the Allied side. 
 After 1941, despite the loss of land and sea connections to the Western world and 
an ending of Soviet aid to China, planners in the United States saw China as a potentially 
powerful postwar ally and as a base from which United States’ air power could strike at 
the interior of Japan’s empire. The proviso to that vision was that China had to be kept in 
the war until adequate air units became available and meanwhile built up into a stable 
power in its own right, in order for the vision to become reality. Reinforcements flowed 
from the United States to Brigadier General Chennault’s China Air Task Force, and 
enabled him to brilliantly stave off the admittedly distracted Japanese and to keep China 
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fighting on the Allied side throughout 1942 and into early 1943. From that success came 
overconfidence and the beginnings of disaster for the Allied cause in China. 
 Throughout 1942 and into early 1943, the United States Army continued to pour 
aerial reinforcements into China, created the Fourteenth Air Force, and sent it on an 
operational mission that violated both the military principles of war and the Fourteenth’s 
strategic mission of aiding China. In accordance with the Europe-first Allied grand 
strategy, the Allied ability to take substantive offensive action in several theaters but not 
in China, and the fact that no theater carried less strategic importance for the Allies than 
did China, all except a minimum of Allied combat aircraft should have massed elsewhere 
than with the China Air Task Force. The Task Force’s structure, if maintained, sufficed 
for its economy of force mission in the face of weakening Japanese opposition. Given the 
imposing difficulty presented by communications to and within China and the proven 
inability of the Chinese Army to stop Japanese aggression, no offensive in or from China 
could hope to secure its bases or maintain any sort of initiative. The Japanese Imperial 
Army needed only march toward any airbase in China in order to gain the initiative by 
diverting the Fourteenth from offensive strikes to flying defensive support for Chinese 
ground forces, and then even that support might not suffice to save the airbase. The 1943 
anti-shipping campaign violated the Fourteenth’s strategic mission, its mission to protect 
China and keep it in the war, by stirring the Japanese to conduct an offensive so vast that 
it pushed the Fourteenth largely out of range of coastal shipping targets, threatened the 
existence of free China, and badly hurt both Chinese morale and the prestige of Chiang 
Kai-shek. 
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 The Twentieth Bomber Command followed the Fourteenth Air Force into China 
and the planning and execution of Operation Matterhorn continued the Fourteenth’s 
established practices of violating the principles of war and failing to contribute positively 
to aiding the Chinese. The Twentieth took its orders from General Arnold and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, rather than Generals Stilwell or Wedemeyer, the two Americans who 
sequentially supposedly commanded all American forces in China, Burma, and India, and 
as a result the efforts of the Twentieth frequently failed to unify with those of the Tenth 
and Fourteenth Air Forces. The Twentieth’s strategic objective, the Japanese steel 
industry, did not serve as the target of any Allied effort with which the Twentieth could 
mass its efforts and even that objective attracted only five of the Twentieth’s first nine 
missions, executed over four months, with an approximate average of only one combat 
mission per twelve days and only one mission against the primary target per twenty-three 
days. While it operated against the Japanese steel industry, the Twentieth likewise failed 
to mass its efforts against the Japanese merchant marine, the primary target of so many 
other Allied forces and the weakest link in the Japanese economic chain. Diplomatically 
and economically, though the Twentieth went to China in part to placate Generalissimo 
Chiang’s desires for prestige and enrichment, it is difficult to conceive of any way in 
which the presence or activities of the Twentieth aided the Chinese people or 
government, except by adding huge sums of money to the already inflated Chinese 
economy. 
 After the bulk of the Twentieth Bomber Command left China and Operation 
Ichigo ran its course, Japanese forces receded from their far-flung conquests under the 
constant harassment of the Fourteenth Air Force. The Allied powers desired a Japanese 
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evacuation of southern China and Lieutenant General Wedemeyer’s Beta plan depended 
upon the occurrence, but the Fourteenth unnecessarily attempted to prevent the process 
regardless. The Fourteenth waged its 1945 transportation campaign with only a few 
hundred, daytime operating aircraft over hundreds of thousands of square miles of 
territory, a force insufficient to prevent Japanese redeployment out of the area, but one 
which certainly destroyed numerous items of infrastructure, delayed the reassertion of 
Kuomintang control, and inhibited economic recovery in the formerly occupied zone. At 
the time, the Fourteenth’s transportation campaign was obviously undesirable and 
insufficient, it proved to be unnecessary, and it once again inflicted unnecessary harm 
upon China and the Chinese rather than helping them, as the Fourteenth was supposed to 
do.  
 The air transport effort between India and China is a thread that runs throughout 
the story of World War II in China after 1941. To support Chennault and maintain at least 
a minimal contact with China, the Hump airlift over the Himalayan Mountains opened in 
early 1942. From a handful of small C-47s, the force that flew over the Hump grew 
steadily, eventually deploying hundreds of huge C-54s, C-46s, C-87s, and C-109s, 
besides smaller transports and, frequently but intermittently, squadrons of bombers. No 
airlift could carry the external commerce that the Chinese might have liked to conduct 
and no airlift could supply enough military equipment to maintain the huge Chinese 
military, but clearly the United States had to maintain some relatively unimpeded contact 
with China. 
 From 1942, the Himalayan airlift usefully served diplomatic and economic ends. 
Diplomats, emissaries, and military leaders from most of the world traveled the Hump if 
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they wished to conduct business with the Chinese. Chinese external commerce with the 
western Allies, to the extent that such existed, flowed outward across the Hump and 
provided the Allies with small quantities of useful materials. The airlift also carried vast 
quantities of both Chinese and foreign currency and undoubtedly some quantities of 
smuggled civilian goods into China; neither may have truly aided the Allied war effort, 
but Chinese leaders demanded them regardless. So much proved useful, but could have 
been carried by little more than a handful of aircraft. 
 Fueled by a demand from within China that constantly increased, the airlift over 
the Himalayan Mountains grew tremendously and wastefully. Each American serviceman 
in China required a slice of the airlift effort in order to supply him or her with what 
Americans considered to be a bare minimum of supplies, and when that bare minimum 
was not met, morale fell; the steady expansion in the number of Americans working in 
China caused a steadily growing drain on the tonnage moved across the Hump. Likewise, 
each additional or larger aircraft that the Fourteenth Air Force deployed in pursuit of its 
poorly conceived goals required additional transport aircraft be assigned to the Hump 
route, or some bombers spend their time ferrying supplies rather than fighting, in order to 
maintain the new arrival. The Twentieth Bomber Command fueled the same difficulty 
because it required more supplies than it itself delivered, even with the addition of 
transport aircraft sent to the area specifically to help in the Twentieth’s effort. In effect, 
the Hump airlift proved to be a magnificent achievement that simply enlarged a vicious 
circle: supply never met demand but both grew larger despite a conspicuous lack of 
return on the effort invested. 
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 The use of bombers as transports glared as example of the wastefulness on the 
Himalayan airlift. The 308TH Bombardment Group’s B-24s served as transports for most 
of their flight hours in 1943, in order to support a few dozen anti-shipping sorties per 
month beginning in July 1943, while over the Atlantic Ocean B-24s flew daily but in 
inadequate numbers against German submarines that caused immense harm to Allied 
shipping and economic efforts. Later, the Twentieth Bomber Command’s B-29s hauled 
supplies during the vast majority of their flight hours in order to conduct just a few actual 
combat missions per month. Beyond these uses of bombers as transports, the additional 
trouble of outright inefficiency was inescapable; bombers were not designed as 
transports. Bombers carried armor plating, guns and mounts, redundant systems, extra 
crew stations, and other equipment, the weight of which detracted from their ability to 
carry a maximum load into a non-combat situation; bombers also lacked a transport 
plane’s larger access points and thus took longer to load and unload than would an 
equivalent tonnage on a transport plane. 
 Allied planners slowly came to realize that the Himalayan airlift consumed 
transport aircraft that would better have served elsewhere. Before the Fourteenth Air 
Force built up for its anti-shipping campaign in 1943 the airlift provided only a meager 
flow of supplies, barely sufficient to allow the skeleton China Air Task Force to fly its 
interception missions plus a few offensive sorties, and the usual diplomatic and economic 
traffic. Then, however, as war moved into Italy and later France and the Low Countries, 
the call for transport aircraft on the battle fronts in Europe grew dramatically and the ever 
growing number of aircraft that shuttled between India and China came to be seen as a 
waste. At the time of the recall crisis, when Generalissimo Chiang engineered the 
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replacement of General Stilwell with Lieutenant General Wedemeyer in hopes of finding 
a more pliable subordinate, General Marshall suggested to President Roosevelt that the 
President ought to respond sternly to Chiang’s machinations partly because air transport 
assets that aided China could better have been employed in the Southwest Pacific Area, 
Italy, or the Netherlands. Despite this damning of the airlift, and the Chinese war effort in 
general, Roosevelt relieved Stilwell and gave in to Chiang; Roosevelt’s belief in Chiang 
had disappeared but doing nothing and hoping for the best proved an easier course than 
abandoning an uncooperative ally, and the airlift continued to grow.145 
 Besides being weak in its theoretical foundations and strategically questionable, 
the American air war in China during World War II suffered from a number of consistent, 
practical difficulties. Logistics posed the chief difficulty for American forces in China: 
that only limited tonnage could cross the Himalayan Mountains restricted the number of 
American soldiers who could serve in China and the number of sorties that Allied aircraft 
could fly from China. When the Fourteenth Air Force encountered these limits, some of 
its aircraft sat uselessly on the ground, others flew logistical missions and eased the 
limits, and few or none flew combat missions to hurt the enemy. When the Twentieth 
Bomber Command encountered logistical limits, its B-29s likewise flew logistical 
missions rather than combat missions, or they abandoned their primary targets in favor 
conducting of logistically sustainable operations from India against secondary targets. In 
either case, logistical difficulties delayed or impeded American air operations.  
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 Maintenance training provided another obstacle to successful American air 
operations in China during World War II. Early in the war, with small quantities of 
numerous types of aircraft pressed into service, maintenance crews expectedly but 
inefficiently lacked the knowledge and equipment to properly maintain many aircraft. 
Later in the war, new types of aircraft, especially B-29s and C-46s, experienced 
numerous mechanical difficulties that no one had previously diagnosed and with which 
no one was prepared to deal. Such difficulties naturally resulted in destroyed, damaged, 
or grounded aircraft and consequent difficulties and delays in various activities. 
 Flight crew training proved to be a consistent and galling difficulty for the 
Twentieth Bomber Command and a lesser but notable difficulty for the Fourteenth Air 
Force. Crews who arrived in theater without adequate training occasionally died while 
crossing the Himalayan Mountains for the first time or proved unable to find either 
targets or home bases reliably, accurately attack targets, fly useful formations, or adjust 
their equipment to unfamiliar local operating conditions. When such deficiencies 
manifested themselves, in-theater training consumed scarce resources and required more 
time than would equal training in the United States. In any case, flight crew training 
deficiencies contributed to the failure of American efforts in China during World War II, 
and especially to the failure of the Twentieth Bomber Command to accomplish its 
theoretically achievable mission.146 
 Security posed another problem for American aerial forces in China during World 
War II. The Chinese Army proved to be unable, and the United States Army unavailable, 
to prevent the Japanese Imperial Army’s attacks against American airbases throughout 
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southern and eastern China. Chinese and American security forces proved unable to 
prevent sabotage and signaling against the Twentieth Bomber Command’s bases around 
Chengtu. American and Indian security forces proved unable to prevent pilferage of 
American supplies in India. Of these, only Japanese ground forces caused tremendous 
damage, but each incidence caused difficulties and delays in American operations. 
 In a 1938 letter, Major Harold McGinnis, one of then Brigadier General Arnold’s 
top men in the Army Air Corps, who closely followed Arnold upward through the ranks 
throughout the war, discussed several pitfalls that might entrap future air forces and that 
ended up entrapping the United States Army Air Force in China during World War II.  
McGinnis warned against air forces attempting to operate from inadequately manned or 
improperly prepared airbases. McGinnis went on to state that only an adequate flow of 
supplies and trained personnel, that the combat forces needed only requisition and must 
absolutely not be involved in transporting or training, could sustain a continuously 
operational air campaign. The principles of war, according to McGinnis, applied to the 
operation of air forces as much as to ground forces, and had to be obeyed in order to 
achieve maximum utility from employed forces. Clearly, at least one influential member 
of the United States Army Air Force knew that most of what his forces did in China 
during World War II contradicted many of the basic, and correct, assumptions made by 
the United States Army Air Corps before the war.147 
 Colonel Edgar Sorenson reminded Commander of the United States Army Air 
Force Lieutenant General Arnold of training difficulties encountered so far and 
foreshadowed problems still to come in China after a May 1942 inspection of air schools 
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in the United States. Sorenson wrote about diverse subjects such as shortages of manuals 
and the apparent assumption that bombardiers required no training in their final aircraft 
types before they deployed to combat. Sorenson also noted that pilot, bombardier, and 
crew training appeared to be generally poor, that commanders lacked foresight when they 
chose which types of skills on which their students trained, and that few men could 
adequately train if their training units lacked adequate equipment. Every one of the 
problems noted by Sorenson in his inspections in the United States later appeared as a 
problem in China or India.148 
 When the United States Army published FM 100-20 Field Service Regulations, 
Command and Employment of Air Power in 1943, it affirmed several long-held theories 
of air power and presciently outlined the errors in the command arrangements made for 
the Twentieth Bomber Command in 1944 and in the Fourteenth Air Force’s targeting in 
1945. FM 100-20 demanded that a theater commander possess centralized control of all 
ground forces and all combat air assets based in his theater, tactical and strategic, and that 
he exercise his control of aerial forces through a single air forces commander. The 
manual further directed that the theater commander select targets for strategic air attack 
and that strategic aircraft only execute tactical attacks when and where the situation was 
vitally important and the strategic forces could play a decisive role. FM 100-20 described 
strategic targets as either important economic targets or critical links in the enemy’s lines 
of communication, which targets both strategic and tactical air assets should attack; the 
manual clearly spelled out that most lines of communication were not critical targets of 
strategic importance and implied that strategic links carried vital economic cargo as well 
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as military forces. The contrast between FM 100-20 and the command structures 
arranged for Operation Matterhorn, where General Arnold exerted direct control from the 
Pentagon, is glaring, even considering the convoluted web comprised of three distinct and 
not fully cooperative national command structures that exerted authority in the China-
Burma-India Theater.149 
 In China during World War II, the United States war effort began successfully but 
later degraded under assorted difficulties of theory and execution into a 
counterproductive effort that worked against American and Chinese interests. Efforts to 
aid China during the period of its lonely war against Japan, from July 1937 into 
December 1941, made military and diplomatic sense and achieved useful goals. The 
small China Air Task Force’s aerial guerrilla war during 1942 bore similar fruit. This 
economy of force theme began to go awry when President Roosevelt consented to 
transform the China Air Task Force into the Fourteenth Air Force and Lieutenant General 
Arnold allocated a group of B-24 heavy bombers, among numerous other units, for duty 
in China. The Twentieth Bomber Command’s deployment to China then continued the 
trend of dispersing critical assets to secondary activities. Near the end of the war, the 
Fourteenth, flush with units that finally lacked any better employment, conducted 
operations designed to prevent Japanese forces from doing what Allied planners wanted 
them to do, and in so doing also worked to destroy the infrastructure of a country which 
the United States hoped would become a powerful ally in the post-war world. The United 
States Army Air Force failed in its attempt to successfully wage World War II in China 
“By Air Power Alone.”  
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